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THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS
EXCEPTION TO FEDERAL
JURISDICTION: RETIDNKING AN
UNSETTI.ED FEDERAL COURTS
DOCTRINEt
MICHAEL AsHLEY STEIN*

INTRODUCTION

In 1859, Supreme Court dicta disclaimed federal courtjurisdiction
over "the subject of divorce, or ... alimony. "1 This pronouncement,
unsupported by either precedent or authority, became the cornerstone
of an "exception" to federal jurisdiction over "domestic relations"-i.e.,
"family law"-cases. Domestic relations actions span a wide spectrum
of subjects that arise under both diversity and federal question jurisdiction and can be divided into four categories: 2 (1) "core" cases, which
make declarations of status such as marriage, divorce, alimony, custody,
and their attendant obligations;3 (2) "core enforcement" cases that
seek to enforce obligations granted in core cases;4 (3) "domestic tort"
cases, which claim injuries to rights awarded in core cases;5 and (4)

t Copyright© 1995, Michael Ashley Stein.
*Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law, New York University; J.D. 1988, Harvard Law School;
M.A. 1994, Ph.D. (expected) 1997, Cambridge University. I am indebted to Michael Dawson,
Martha Field, Larry Kramer, Tami Lefko, Martha Minow, Burt Neuborne,Judith Resnik, Aviam
Soifer, David Wilkins, and especially David Shapiro for reviewing drafts of this Article. The views
expressed herein, as well as any errors, are my own.
1 Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1858).
2 The categories used in this Article modifY those annunciated by Justice Blackmun. See
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206, 2221-22 (1992) (Blackmun,J., concurring).
3 With one notable exception, core cases have consistently been excluded from federal
jurisdiction. See infra notes 48-49.
4 See, e.g., Drewes v. Ilnicki, 863 F.2d 469, 471 (6th Cir. 1988) (action to enforce support
arrearages);Jagiella v.Jagiella, 647 F.2d 561, 562 (5th Cir. 1981) (suit for overdue child support
payments); Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1975) (claim based on separation
agreement); Hernstadt v. Hernstadt, 373 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1967) (alleging violation of custody
and visitation agreement).
5 See, e.g., Ingram v. Hayes, 866 F.2d 368 (lith Cir. 1988) (action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress); Uoyd v. Loeffier, 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982) (claim of interference with the
custody of a child); Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (suit for past violations of
an established custody order); Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1981) (asserting claim for
malicious frustration of exercise of civil rights). This category intentionally excludes contract
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"domestic federal question" cases that claim constitutional or other
federal violations of core case rights. 6 Core, core enforcement, and
domestic tort cases are usually brought pursuant to the diversity statute7 while domestic federal question cases invoke federal question
jurisdiction.8
The "domestic relations exception" to federal court jurisdiction
has not been uniformly embraced. Over the years, both federal courts
and commentators have debated the validity and scope of a domestic
relations exception to either diversity or federal question jurisdiction.
The disagreement among federal judges has occasioned inter-circuit
conflicts over federal court adjudication of core enforcement, domestic tort, and domestic federal question actions, as well as intra-circuit
conflicts over domestic federal question actions. Commentators, in
turn, disagree not only about the merits of continuing to recognize
such an exception, but also as to whether the exception is a jurisdictional or a jurisprudential bar to hearing cases.
Underlying these disagreements is a complex and unresolved debate over the proper role of federal courts in adjudicating a substantive
area of law traditionally considered within the exclusive purview of
state courts. At issue are the competing federal courts notions of
mandatory jurisdiction and discretion, differing ideas of federalism
and comity, and the controversy over whether parity exists between
federal and state tribunals. Although I do not in this Article attempt
final resolution of these issues,9 I propose that the question of where
cases, because most assertions of breach of contract may be characterized as core enforcement
actions. See, e.g.,]agiella, 647 F.2d at 562 (suit for overdue child support payments).
An area of contract law that does not fall within the core enforcement category and has yet
to be raised in federal court as a domestic relations case is the area of claims arising from
surrogate motherhood contract agreements. As more and more states outlaw such arrangements,
prospective parents may reach out to surrogates in other jurisdictions, creating diversity of
citizenship and causing constitutional as well as conflict-of·law problems. See generally MARTHA
A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD (1988).
6 See, e.g., Fernos-Lopez v. Figarella Lopez, 929 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1991) (habeas corpus
petition challenging Puerto Rico's alimony statute); Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 935-36 (6th
Cir. 1985) (§ 1983 action alleging conspiracy to wrongfully deprive claimant of physical custody
of her children); Lossman v. Pekarske, 707 F.2d 288 (7th Cir. 1983) (§ 1983 action alleging
deprivation of liberty associated with removal of children from father's custody); Rowell v.
Oesterle, 626 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1980) (habeas corpus petition seeking "release" of petitioner's
two children).
A federal question claim that has not yet arisen but which will probably be asserted in the
near future is the issue of ownership and fair use of intellectual property that had been part of
a marital estate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988) (providing exclusive federal jurisdiction over
patent, trademark, and copyright cases).
7 28 u.s.c. § 1332 (1988).
8 28 u.s.c. § 1331 (1988).
9 As Professor Robert Cover notes, "[t]he jurisdictional complexities of the American system
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domestic relations belongs in our dual system acts as a baseline for
considering these different notions. 10 In addition, resolution of these
issues is of practical significance to our judicial system in a variety of
other contexts, because their examination can help better define the
boundaries between federal and state courts.
The Supreme Court has not issued clear guidance that would help
resolve this debate. In 1992, in Ankrmbrandt v. Richards, the Supreme
Court addressed the subject of a domestic relations exception for the
first time in more than sixty years. 11 The Court both reaffirmed and
narrowed an exception of certain core cases from federal jurisdiction,
but declined either to explicate the jurisdictional boundaries of core
enforcement and domestic tort actions or to explain the mechanics of
abstaining from either type of action. 12 The Court also failed to address
whether domestic federal question claims are exempt from district
court review. As a result the lower federal courts have been left without
clear guidance on how to resolve their inconsistent and often conflicting approaches to the domestic relations exception-if indeed such an
exception is to be recognized and applied at all.
This Article examines the circuitous development of the domestic
relations exception to federal jurisdiction from Barber v. Barber to the
contemporary decision of Ankrmbrandt v. Richards. It asserts that, following Ankenbrandt, federal court jurisdiction exists over all non-core
actions properly arising under either the diversity or federal question
jurisdiction statutes. The Article then addresses the issue of whether
the existence of jurisdiction compels federal court adjudication of all
domestic related disputes within their purview or, instead, permits
abstention from those cases. The Article asserts the propriety of abstention principles and proposes a new form of abstention whose application would exclude from federal review all core cases as well as suits
raising difficult issues of unresolved state law. It then evaluates the
competing policy concerns informing a federal court's decision
whether to exert jurisdiction over non-core actions, concluding that

of courts have occupied generations of scholars, perplexed generations of students, and enriched
generations of lawyers." Robert M. Cover, The Uses ofjurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideoloffj,
and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 639, 639 (1981).
10 See judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts,
66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1682, 1747 (1991) ('The subsequent construction of [Barber] as about the
disavowal of federal court authority, and the overlay of congressional regulation of family life
might be a basis for teachers and theorists of the federal courts to discuss the appropriate
allocation of authority between state and federal court systems .... ").
11112 S. Ct. 2206 (1992).
12 Jd.
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prudential considerations support the jurisdictional lines drawn in the
proposed "Ankenbrandt abstention" doctrine.
Part I sets forth the history of the domestic relations exception to
federal jurisdiction, from its origin in Barber v. Barber 3 to the Supreme
Court's most recent treatment of the exception in Anlumbrandt v.
Richards. 14 Part II addresses the question of whether federal courts
must assert their jurisdiction over non-core cases. It begins by reviewing
the debate between those scholars who advocate mandatory jurisdiction and those who support judicially created exceptions, especially
abstention. It concludes that equitable restraint of federal courts is a
valid limitation on federal jurisdiction provided the limitation is principled and well delineated. Part II then reviews existing abstention
doctrines and considers their applicability to non-core domestic relations matters. It asserts that the proper type of abstention doctrine to
apply in the domestic relations context is a corollary of existing abstention doctrine. Part II concludes by proposing and explicating the
parameters of a new abstention doctrine-"Ankenbrandt abstention."
Under Ankenbrandtabstention, federal courts would abstain from hearing cases over which they otherwise have jurisdiction if those cases were
either core cases or raised difficult issues of unresolved state law.
District courts could also retain jurisdiction over a suit to ensure later
resolution of non-domestic issues.
Because abstention under Ankenbrandt, as under any other abstention doctrine, would be discretionary, Part III examines the policy
reasons traditionally offered by federal courts for declining to hear
domestic relations cases. These reasons include special state interest
and expertise, an unstated distaste for what are perceived as local
family matters, and federal docket congestion. Part III demonstrates
that countervailing policy concerns favoring federal court jurisdiction
outweigh each of these traditionally utilized policies. These countervailing concerns include recognition of the national character of many
family law doctrines, traditional diversity concerns of preventing prejudice against non-local parties, a general institutional duty of federal
courts to exercise their jurisdiction, and the protection of federal
rights. Interwoven with this analysis are notions of federalism, comity
and parity.

1362 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1858).
14112 S. Ct. 2206.
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THE HISTORY OF THE DoMESTic RELATIONS ExcEPTION TO
FEDERAL jURISDICTION

In 1858, Huldah Adeline Barber, through her "next friend, "15
applied to the New York Court of Chancery for divorce from her
husband, Hiram Barber.16 Shortly after the grant of the decree, which
also awarded Huldah alimony, 17 Hiram fled to Wisconsin in order to
avoid New York state court jurisdiction. He then sued his former wife
for divorce in a Wisconsin state court, omitting from his complaint any
reference to the New York decree and asserting instead that his wife
had "wilfully abandoned him. "18
In response, Huldah sued Hiram in Wisconsin federal district
court for enforcement of the New York State divorce decree. Hiram
moved for dismissal of the suit, alleging that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to hear the matter on two grounds. First, he asserted that
the federal court could not adjudicate the dispute because diversity of
citizenship could never exist between previously married individuals,
the wife's citizenship necessarily remaining that of her husband. 19 Sec15 Like other married women of her era, Mrs. Barber was represented through a "next friend"
because she was not legally able to bring suit on her own behalf. See 1 RoGER FosTER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE IN CIVIL CAsES 91-92 (Boston, Boston Book Co. 1892) ("[T]he rule was early laid down
as follows: 'Where the wife complains of the husband and asks relief against him she must use
the name of some other person in prosecuting the suit ... .'" (quoting Bein v. Heath, 47 U.S. (6
How.) 228, 240 (1848))). This practice was adopted from English common law, under which a
woman could not maintain a suit in her own name unless her husband was either exiled or had
"abjured the realm." See 1 WIU.IAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *443.
16 See Barber, 62 U.S. at 582.
17Jn issuing the decree, the court of chancery found that Hiram was "guilty of cruel and
inhuman treatment of his wife"whom "he had abandoned, neglected and refused to provide for."
Barber, 62 U.S. at 585. The divorce granted was therefore a mensa et tharo, or "from bed and
board ... by which the parties are separated and forbidden to live or cohabit together, without
affecting the marriage itself," in contrast to divorce a vinculo matrimonii, or "from the bond of
marriage." See BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 480 (6th ed. 1990). Divorces a mensa et thvro were
granted in England, usually by ecclesiastical courts, for abandonment and for acts of cruelty. The
grant of a divorce a vinculo matrimonii was only by act of Parliament and presupposed the
marriage void ab initio. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES *440-41; see also HoMER H.
CLARK, JR., LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS§ 11.1, at 281 (1968).
18 See Barber, 62 U.S. at 588. Based on Huldah's allegedly absconding, Hiram had requested
a divorce a vinculo matrimonii.
19 See id. at 589. This was a generally accepted legal axiom of the Barbers' time. See, e.g., C.L.
BATES, FEDERAL PROCEDURE AT LAW: A TREATISE ON THE PROCEDURE IN SUITS AT COMMON LAW
IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 210-11 (1908);JoHN W. DWYER, THE LAW AND
PROCEDURE OF THE UNITED STATES 205--06 (1901); ROBERT M. HUGHES, HANDBOOK OF JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE IN UNITED STATES COURTS 246 (1913); ALFRED JOHN SCHWEPPE,
SIMKINS FEDERAL PRACTICE 337-38 (rev. ed. 1934). Like many other women's legal disabilities
extant in the United States, this precept originated in England. See EDWARD CoKE, THE FIRST
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ond, he argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the
subject of alimony was strictly within the purview of English ecclesiastical courts at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. 20 Because
he viewed federal court jurisdiction as extending only to matters that
had been within the scope of English law and equity powers, that
jurisdiction did not extend to alimony. 21 The district court rejected
Hiram's assertions and exercised jurisdiction. On appeal to the Supreme Court,22 Hiram continued to aver that the district court lacked
both diversity and subject matter jurisdiction.
Rejecting both of Hiram's jurisdictional arguments, the Supreme
Court affirmed the New York state divorce and alimony decree and
directed the Wisconsin federal territorial court to issue a mandate
PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 112 (London 1628) ("By marriage, the
husband and wife become one person in law; that is, the very being or legal existence of the
woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated or consolidated into that of
the husband, under whose wing and protection she performs everything."); 2 jAMES KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 109 (Bernard D. Reams, Jr., ed. 1984) (1827) ("The legal
effects of marriage are generally deducible from the principle of the common law, by which the
husband and wife are regarded as one person, and her legal existence and authority in a degree
lost and suspended during the existence of the matrimonial union."); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *442 (same). By contrast, "[s]tates today recognize the ability of a wife to establish
a domicile separate from that of her husband for divorce purposes." RoBERT A. LEFLAR, AI.tERI·
CAN CONFUCTS LAw§ 11, at 19 (1977).
The question of who can legally be a citizen is complex. See, e.g., PETER H. ScHUCK & ROGERS
M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE .A!.tERICAN POLITY 9-41
(1985) (comparing "ascriptive" citizenship, which arises from circumstances like birth, to "con·
sensual" citizenship created by agreement); JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE
QUEST FOR INcLUSION 49-61 (1991) (examining efforts to extend citizenship to slaves, women,
people without property, and young people); Peter H. Schuck, Membership in the Liberal Polity:
The Devaluation ofAmerican Citizenship, 3 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 1 (1989) (considering how equality
and due process principles affected the meaning ofUnited States citizenship). The above citations
are culled from Resnik, supra note 10, at 1738 n.293.
20 See Barber, 62 U.S. at 592.
21 See id. The assertion that federal court jurisdiction was coterminous with English practice
at the time of the Constitution's adoption was a common basis for denying jurisdiction. For
example, in the years prior to the Barber decision in the nineteenth century, the Court often
interpreted the scope offederal court jurisdiction under the judiciary Act by referring to English
judicial authority. See, e.g., Storyv. Livingston, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 359, 368-69 (1839) (striking down
rule made by the District Court of Louisiana, abolishing chancery practice); Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212, 221-23 (1818) (rights to hold legal title to land followed those under
English law). This was also the explanation given to justify the exception from federal jurisdiction
of probate matters. See, e.g., Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369, 384-85 (1854) (parens
patria power to allocate a charitable trust same as that established in Elizabethan England).
22 Because the appeal came from a district court located in what is referred to in the case as
a "territory," there is the danger of erroneously viewing Barber as the same type of "territorial"
case discussed infra text accompanying notes 35-43. See Resnik, supra note 10, at 1742 n.314
(making the above admonition). In fact, Wisconsin was admitted to the Union 10 years prior to
the Barber decision. See An Act for the Admission of the State of Wisconsin into the Union, ch.
50, § I, 9 Stat. 233, 233 (1848). By an earlier act, Congress had established a federal district court
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consistent with the New York holding. 23 The Court began its opinion
with the famous pronouncement, unsupported by either precedent or
authority, 24 that would become the "fountainhead"25 of the domestic
relations exception: ''We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the
courts of the United States upon the subject of divorce, or for the
allowance of alimony, either as an original proceeding in chancery or
as an incident to divorce .... "26 Having thus eschewed any jurisdiction
over the grant of either divorce or alimony, the Court explicitly rejected Hiram's arguments, reasoning that, although a suit for the
allowance of divorce or alimony exceeded the boundaries of English
and, therefore, its own jurisdiction, a suit to enforce a divorce or
alimony decree lay fully within both English and federal court equity
jurisdiction.27 The Court also rejected Hiram's argument that marriage

in Wisconsin empowered to hear "suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity." See Act of
Aug. 6, 1846, ch. 89, § 4, 9 Stat. 56, 57.
23 See Barber, 62 U.S. at 599-600.
24 "The domestic relations exception did not originate in an unequivocal holding by the
United States Supreme Court; rather it evolved from dicta in two Supreme Court cases." Mark
Stephen Poker, Comment, A Proposalf(JT the Abolition of the Domestic Rekltions Exception, 71 MARQ.
L. REv. 141, 144 (1987); see Note, Domestic Rekltions-Federal Courts Held to Have jurisdiction to
Decklre Div()Tce Invalid, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 631, 634 (1969) [hereinafter Note, Domestic Rekltions]
("[I]n dictum, for no apparent reason and without citing any authority, the Court disclaimed any
jurisdiction ••.. "); Linda A. Ouellette, Note, The Domestic Rekltions Exception to Diversity jurisdiction: A Re-Evaluation, 24 B.C. L. REv. 661, 684 (1983) ('The domestic relations exception has
its source in dicta."); Anthony B. Ullman, Note, The Domestic Rekltions Exception to Diversity
jurisdiction, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1824, 1830 (1983) ("The exception, a judicial creation, originated
in early Supreme Court dicta."); see al5oAllan D. Vestal and David L. Foster, Implied Limitations
on the Diversity Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 41 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1956); Rebecca E. Swenson,
Note, Application of the Federal Abstention Doctrines to the Domestic Rekltions Exception to Federal
Diversity jurisdiction, 1983 DuKE LJ. 1095 (1983).
25 Michael L. Corrado, Comment, Enf()Tcing State Domestic Rekltions Decrees in Federal Courts,
50 U. CHI. L. REv. 1357, 1360 (1983); see al5o Barbara Ann Atwood, Domestic Rekltions Cases in
Federal Court: Toward a Principled Exercise ofjurisdiction, 35 HAsTINGs LJ. 571, 573-74 (1984)
('The reluctance to entertain domestic relations cases originated in nineteenth century Supreme
Court dicta concerning the scope of the federal court's law and equity jurisdiction."); Sharon
Elizabeth Rush, Domestic Rekltions Law: Federal jurisdiction and State Sovereignty in Perspective, 60
NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1, 1 (1984) ("Although the Court announced the disclaimer only in dicta,
and no authoritative analysis of its validity exists, federal courts have adamantly declared that the
domestic relations exception divests them of jurisdiction over divorce, alimony, and child custody. "); Bonnie Moore, Comment, Federal jurisdiction and the Domestic Rekltions Exception: A
Search for Parameters, 31 UCLA L. REv. 843, 848 (1984) ("This dictum has since been cited as
authority for the domestic relations exception in most of the cases dealing with the exception.");
Ouellette, supra note 24, at 668 n.62 ('That the Supreme Court's dicta is unsupported by
authority is, in fact, a primary focus of the doctrine's critics."); Poker, supra note 24, at 146 ("The
Supreme Court, through its dicta in Barber ... laid the foundation for the domestic relations
exception.").
26 Barber, 62 U.S. at 584.
27 See id. at 589.
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precluded diversity of citizenship between the parties. Instead, the
Court held that Huldah's divorce decree entitled her to her own
domicile. It also recognized women's individual domiciles when acting
as plaintiffs in their own divorce suits. 28 Accordingly, Huldah Barber
had satisfied the jurisdictional requirements to bring suit. 29
Three Justices dissented, taking issue with the majority for
affirming the district court's jurisdiction. The dissenters asserted first
that a married woman could never have a domicile separate from her
husband, because legally they were considered one person.30 They next
asserted that federal courts totally lacked jurisdiction over domestic
relations matters, because English law empowered the ecclesiastic
courts, not the courts of equity, to adjudicate all such cases.31 Finally,
the dissenters ruminated that domestic relations matters as a whole
were special enclaves of state governance. 32
The use of the Barber dicta as precedent for a domestic relations
exception was bolstered thirty years later in In re Burrus. 33 In that case,
28 Id. at 589, 591. The Court's ruling has been characterized as a "stunning victory for the
relatively small number of wives who could first obtain recognition of their separate legal status."
Resnik, supra note 10, at 1741; see also Rogers Smith, "One United People": Second Class Female
Citizenship and the American (blest for Community, 1 YALEj.L. & HuMAN. 229, 254 (1989) (Barber
"remains the closest the Supreme Court came to enunciating a liberal egalitarian view of the
status of women during the antebellum years.").
29 The only other hurdle to obtaining jurisdiction was satisfying the jurisdictional amount.
At the time of Barber, the minimum amount in controversy requirement was the original $500
fixed by the Judiciary Act of 1789. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78. The
amount has since been steadily increased. See Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24 Stat. 552, 552
(to $2,000 in 1887); Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1087, 1091 (to $3,000 in 1911);
Act ofjuly 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 1, 72 Stat. 415, 415 (to $10,000 in 1958); Act of Nov.
19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 201, 102 Stat. 4640, 4646 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988))
(to $50,000 in 1988). The use of the minimum amount in controversy requirement as a bar to
jurisdiction over domestic relations cases is discussed infra note 279 and accompanying text.
30 See Barber, 62 U.S. at 600-02 ("(H]ow can it be conceived that pending the existence of
this relation the unity it creates can be reconciled with separate and independent capacities in
that unity, such as belong to beings wholly disconnected?").
31 ld. at 605. In so arguing, the dissent did not specifically mention the judiciary Act of 1789
or any other legislative provision.
32 The rhetoric employed by the dissent offers insight into the nineteenth-century political
mindset that inspired the domestic relations exception and is worth quoting at length:
It is not in accordance with the design and operation of a Government having its
origin in causes and necessities, political, general, and external, that it should
assume to regulate the domestic relations of society; should, with a kind of inquisitorial authority, enter the habitations and even into the chambers and nurseries of
private families, and inquire into and pronounce upon the morals and habits and
affectations or antipathies of the members of every household.... The Federal
tribunals can have no power to control the duties or the habits of the different
members of private families in their domestic intercourse.
ld. at 602.
33136 u.s. 586 (1890).
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a father brought an action for a writ of habeas corpus seeking to regain
custody of his daughter after she had been unlawfully detained by her
grandparents. Citing Barber, the Supreme Court denied jurisdiction on
the grounds that "[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of
husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States
and not to the laws of the United States."34 The Court did not, however,
make any mention of a principled basis for this lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
Adding to the confusion in this area, two succeeding Supreme
Court decisions held that federal courts had jurisdiction to hear appeals of core cases when they originated in federal territorial courts.35
In Simms v. Simms,36 the Court held that, although it may ''be assumed
as indubitable" that the federal courts have no jurisdiction over core
cases, the Court did have jurisdiction to review divorce decrees appealed from the Supreme Court of the Arizona Territory.37 The Court
justified its exercise ofjurisdiction on the grounds that the divorce had
been granted in a territorial (albeit federal) court, rather than an
Article III court. 38 As observed, however, by Professor Elizabeth Rush,
"the Simms Court did not address the [odd] fact that the Supreme
Court was itself an article III court, even when reviewing a territorial
court's alimony award."39
Seven years later, in De La Rama v. De La Rama,40 an appeal of an
alimony decree from the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, the
Court, citing Barber, explained the historical reasons why diversity
jurisdiction did not extend to core actions. 41 Conspicuously absent
from the rationales offered were the "common law or equity" distinctions made by the Barber dissent. This absence is particularly difficult
to understand given that the appellate jurisdictional statute at issue,
34 Id. at 593-94.
35 Congressional

legislation provided for Supreme Court review of cases appealed from the
Supreme Courts of the territories and the Philippine Islands as long as they met a minimum
jurisdictional amount-in-controversy requirement- See Act of Sept- 9, 1850, ch. 51,§ 9, 9 Stat- 453,
455-56 (Utah); Act of Mar. 2, 1861, ch. 86, § 9, 12 Stat- 239, 241-42 (Dakota); Act of Feb. 24,
1863, ch. 56,§ 2, 12 Stat- 664, 665 (Arizona); Act ofJuly 1, 1902, ch. 1369, § 10,32 Stat- 691, 695
(Philippine Islands).
36175 u.s. 162 (1899).
37 Id. at 167-68.
38 Id. at 168.
S9 See Rush, supra note 25, at 4 n.16.
40201 u.s. 303 (1906).
41 The De La Rama Court explained that the exception was supported "both by reasons of
fact that the husband and wife cannot usually be citizens of different States, so long as the
marriage relation continues, and for the further reason that a suit for divorce in itself involves
no pecuniary value." Id. at 307. In addition, two cases from the District of Columbia Orphan's

678

BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:669

extending to "all actions, cases, causes, and proceedings, "42 freely allowed the Court to distinguish this case from the "common law or
equity" limitation of the diversity statute. The De La Rama Court,
distancing itself from Barber, instead chose to reaffirm explicitly the
curious and circumspect Simms rationale. 43
A quarter century later, in Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Alger,44 the Court
held that a federal statute granting exclusive federal court jurisdiction
over "all suits and proceedings against ... consuls or vice-consuls"45
did not preclude state adjudication of divorce decrees involving such
officials. Popovici involved an appeal by a Romanian vice-consul from
a state divorce decree based upon the state court's apparent lack of
authority to adjudicate the matter. In disclaiming exclusive federal
jurisdiction, Justice Holmes did not cite the diversity statute. Instead,
he traced the absence ofjurisdiction directly to the Constitp.tion: if the
Framers contemplated that states would preside exclusively over domestic relations matters, then construing the Constitution accordingly
is easy; construing the statute accordingly is not much harder. 46 Thus,
Justice Holmes reasoned, the phrase "suits and proceedings against ...
consuls and vice-consuls" necessarily referred to "ordinary civil proceedings" and not to domestic matters, which formally would have
been the province of ecclesiastical courts.47

Court reached the Supreme Court in which parties sought guardianship over infants. Both times
the Court held that the monetary value of guardianship f.-llled to satisfy the required amount in
controversy. See De Krafft v. Barney, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 704, 714 (1862); Ritchie v. Mauro, 27 U.S.
(2 Pet.) 243, 244 (1829). In another child case between two parents, the Court held that custody
was a matter "utterly incapable of being reduced to any pecuniary standard of value." The
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction could therefore not be exercised, and the lower court
decision went unchallenged. See Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103, 120 (1847),
42 § 10, 32 Stat. at 695.
43 See De La Rama, 201 U.S. at 308; Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899).
44 280 u.s. 379 (1930).
45 See Federal Judicial Code, Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §§ 24, 233, 256, 36 Stat. 1087,
1091-94, 1156, 1160-61. The Judicial Code interpreted Article II, § 2, cl. 1 of the Constitution,
providing in pertinent part that "[t]he judicial Power shall extend ... to all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls ..•. " U.S. CoNsT. art. II,§ 2. The Judicial Code
sections have been revised and codified as follows:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the
States, of all civil actions and proceedings against(1) consuls or vice consuls of foreign states; or
(2) members of a mission or members of their families ....
28 u.s.c. § 1351 (1988).
46 Ohio ex reL Popovici, 280 U.S. at 383.
47 Id. at 384.
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Given the inconsistencies of the Supreme Court's approach in this
area, it is not surprising that, throughout the history of federal court
adjudication of domestic relations cases, judges and scholars have
debated the existence and scope of an exception to federal court
jurisdiction. With one notable exception,48 district courts agree that
their jurisdiction does not extend to core suits.49 Beyond this initial
agreement, however, the approach taken by federal courts to non-core
actions may be most charitably described as chaotic.50 Inter-circuit

48 See Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (federal courts authorized to
determine validity of foreign divorce decrees). Although Judge Jack B. Weinstein's opinion was
the first to hold explicitly that jurisdiction existed over a core case, a handful of cases have raised
core issues only to dispose of them on other grounds. See, e.g., Southard v. Southard, 305 F.2d
730 (2d Cir. 1962) (issue already litigated); Harrison v. Harrison, 214 F.2d 571 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 896 (1954) (issue already litigated); Cohen v. Randall, 137 F.2d 441 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 796 (1943) (failure to state a claim); McNeil v. McNeil, 78 F. 834 (C.C.N.D.
Cal. 1897), aff'd, 170 F. 289 (9th Cir. 1909) (laches); see also Note, Domestic Relations, supra note
24, at 633 (optimistically yet erroneously interpreting Spindel as opening "the door for reexamination of the whole question of federal jurisdiction in divorce and domestic relations cases").
49 "As a general rule, federal courts refuse to hear 'suits for divorce and alimony, child custody
actions, disputes over visitation rights, suits to establish paternity and to obtain child support, and
actions to enforce separation or divorce decrees still subject to state court modification.'" Congleton v. Holy Cross Child Placement Agency, 919 F.2d 1077, 1078 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Crouch v.
Crouch, 566 F.2d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 1978) (citations omitted)); see also Vaughan v. Smithson, 883
F.2d 63, 64 (lOth Cir. 1989) ("It is now well established that federal courts do not have diversity
jurisdiction to grant a divorce or annulment, determine support payments, or award custody of
a child."); Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832, 834 (4th Cir. 1982) ("[T]he federal courts
have long held that diversity jurisdiction does not include the power to grant divorces, determine
alimony or support obligations, or determine child custody rights."); Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d
371, 372 (9th Cir. 1968) ("[E]ven though there is diversity of citizenship and a sufficient amount
in controversy to satisfy the technical jurisdictional requirements, the federal courts have no
jurisdiction of suits to establish paternity and child support." (citing Albanese v. Richter, 161 F.2d
688 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 782 (1947))).
Federal courts also have declined to decide child custody disputes on the grounds that no
amount in controversy could be established because the dispute cannot be "reduced to monetary
value." SeeJOHN W. DwYER, THE LAw AND PROCEDURE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 193 (1901)
("[I]n such a case there is no pecuniary standard of value, as it rises superior to money considerations."); see also CHARLES P. WILLIAMS, JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE OF FEDERAL COURTS: A
HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS AND STUDENTS 100 (1917) ("[T]he inestimable privilege of civil
liberty, the value of the custody of the child, or of a severance of the marriage relation, are too
imponderable to be weighed and calculated in the ordinary method of business transactions.").
50 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 25, at 850 ("[W]hile the domestic relations exception has
become well established, it has not become well defined." (footnote omitted)); Ouellette, supra
note 24, at 663 ("[T]he domestic relations exception has grown into a well-established, but
inconsistent and confusing doctrine .... ");Poker, supra note 24, at 142 ("The breadth of the
exception ... remain[s] unclear."); Swenson, supra note 24, at 1100 ("A confused and inconsistent domestic relations exception doctrine has emerged .... ");Ullman, supra note 24, at 1824
("[W]hile all courts have adhered to the domestic relations exception, the breadth of the
exception, as well as justifications for it, remain unclear." (footnotes omitted)).
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conflicts exist over the propriety of hearing core enforcement, domestic tort, and domestic federal question cases. For example, while the
Fourth,51 Fifth,52 Sixth53 and Eleventh54 Circuits have held that federal
courts may exercise jurisdiction over core enforcement suits, the Second,55 Third56 and Seventh57 Circuits have reached the opposite conclusion. Federal courts have likewise diverged over the extent of an
exception for domestic tort actions. For example, the District of Columbia,58 Fourth,59 Fifth,60 Sixth61 and Seventh62 Circuits will entertain
these suits, whereas the First63 and Eleventh64 will not.
An inter-circuit conflict also exists over whether domestic federal
question suits may properly be heard in federal fora. The Second,65

51

See, e.g., Keating v. Keating, 542 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1976) (where state alimony and support
decree is in force, district court has authority to enforce both past and future violations).
52 See, e.g., Erspan v. Badgett, 647 F.2d 550, 551 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that the district
court did not err in asserting jurisdiction in diversity action to enforce terms of Texas divorce
decree awarding plaintiff former wife one half of defendant former husband's accumulated right
under United States Army retirement benefits progran~).
53 See, e.g., Drewes v. Ilnicki, 863 F.2d 469, 471 (6th Cir. 1988) ("Federal courts will also
exercise jurisdiction over the enforcement of support arrearages.").
54 See, e.g., Kirby v. Mellenger, 830 F.2d 176 (11th Cir. 1987) (district court abused its
discretion in dismissing suit to obtain share of husband's military retirement benefits).
55 See, e.g., Bernstadt v. Bernstadt, 373 F.2d 316, 317 (2d Cir. 1967) ("[F]ederal courts do
not adjudicate cases involving the custody of minors and, a fortiori, rights of visitation.").
56 See, e.g., Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1975) (separation or support
agreements are treated as ordinary enforceable contracts).
57 See, e.g., Uoyd v. Loeffier, 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982) (suit for interference with custody).
58 See, e.g., Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (allowing tort suit based on
parental kidnapping).
59 See, e.g., Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832,834 (4th Cir. 1982) (permitting a district
court to proceed with an action for the torts of child enticement and intentional infliction of
emotional distress).
60 See, e.g., Goins v. Goins, 777 F.2d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting that "even when
domestic relation matters are involved, a federal court may be a proper forum where the claims
arise from tortious conduct").
61 See, e.g., Drewes v. Ilnicki, 863 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that the exception does
not apply to a tort suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
62 See, e.g., Uoyd v. Loeffier, 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that the exception does
not apply to a tort claim for interference with the custody of a child).
63 See, e.g., Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1981) (refusing to decide tort of malicious
frustration of exercise of civil rights).
64 See, e.g., lngran~ v. Hayes, 866 F.2d 368 (11th Cir. 1988) (exception divests federal courts
ofjurisdiction over tort actions for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
65 See, e.g., Bernstadt v. Bernstadt, 373 F.2d 316, 317-18 (2d Cir. 1967) ("When a pure
question of constitutional law is presented, this court has suggested that the District Court may
assume jurisdiction even if the question arises out of a domestic relations dispute .... ").
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Fourth,66 Fifth67 and Eleventh68 Circuits have held that district courts
may assume jurisdiction over constitutional actions even though they
arise from a domestic context, contrary to the holdings of the Third69
and Ninth7 Circuits. Adding to this confusion, the First,71 Sixth72 and
Eighth73 Circuits have intra-circuit conflicts over the propriety of adjudicating federal question domestic cases.
With this tremendous conflict within and among the circuits as a
backdrop, the Ankenbrandt Court revisited the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction in 1992,74 more than sixty years after its
decision in Popovici. In 1989, Missouri citizen Carol Ankenbrandt sued
her former husband and his female companion, who were Louisiana

°

66 See, e.g., Keiser v. Anne Arundel County Dep't of Social Servs., 679 F.2d 1092 (4th Cir.
1982) (remanding a§ 1983 claim to proceed on the merits).
67 See, e.g., Rowell v. Oesterle, 626 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1980) (allowing habeas corpus petition
seeking "release" of petitioner's two children).
68 See, e.g., Ingram, 866 F.2d at 370 ('"!'he district court properly exercised jurisdiction over
this federal question despite its domestic relations genesis.").
69 See, e.g., Magaziner v. Montemuro, 468 F.2d 782 (3d Cir. 1972) (abstaining from deciding
a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 on grounds of domestic relations exception).
70 See, e.g., Tree Top v. Smith, 577 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1978) (disallowing habeas petition).
71 Compare Femos-Lopez v. Figarella Lopez, 929 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1991) (domestic relations
exception to federal jurisdiction did not apply to habeas petition challenging Puerto Rico's
alimony statute) with Hernon v. Office of Pub. Guardian, 878 F.2d 13, 14 (1st Cir. 1989) ("It is
settled law that federal habeas corpus jurisdiction does not extend to state court disputes over
child custody.") and Sylvander v. New England Home for Little Wanderers, 584 F.2d 1103, 1113
(1st Cir. 1978) (child custody rulings by themselves are not sufficient to trigger a federal habeas
remedy on behalf of a dissatisfied mother).
72 CompareAgg v. Flanagan, 855 F.2d 336, 336-37 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that district court
had subject matter jurisdiction over § 1983 civil rights class action brought on behalf of all male
litigants of particular state family court who would be subject to certain wage assignments,
garnishments, or wage attachments) and Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 935-36 (6th Cir. 1985)
(former wife's complaint alleging that former husband and others conspired to wrongfully
deprive her of physical custody of her children without due process stated a cause of action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983) withFirestonev. Cleveland Trust Co., 654 F.2d 1212, 1215 (6th Cir. 1981) ("Even
when brought under the guise of a federal question action, a suit whose substance is domestic
relations generally will not be entertained in a federal court.") and Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586
F.2d 625, 627 (6th Cir. 1978) (disallowing a habeas petition).
73 Compare Ruffalo ex rel. Ruffalo v. Civiletti, 702 F.2d 710, 711 (8th Cir. 1983) (domestic
relations exception to federaljurisdiction did not apply to mother's constitutional action against
federal officials seeking return of minor son) and Overman v. United States, 563 F.2d 1287, 1292
(8th Cir. 1977) {stating that "[t]here is, and ought to be, a continuing federal policy to avoid
handling domestic relations cases in federal court in the absence of important concerns of a
constitutional dimension") with Bergstrom v. Bergstrom, 623 F.2d 517, 520 (8th Cir. 1980)
("Where a constitutional issue arises out of a custody dispute •.. the proper course is to dismiss
the case and remand to the state court.").
74 Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206 (1992).
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citizens, on behalf of the Ankenbrandt children for damages caused
by their alleged sexual and physical abuse. Carol Ankenbrandt brought
suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana and asserted federal jurisdiction under the diversity of citizenship provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack· of jurisdiction, contending that the subject matter of the
case, although itself a tort action, necessarily placed it within the
domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction. The district court
granted the defendants' motion, citing In re Burrus75 for the proposition that "[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations ... belongs to
the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States. "76 As an
alternative basis for its holding, the district court concluded that,
because adjudication of the raised issues would require it to "become
overly involved in the state court's determination"77 of the underlying
abuse and custody determinations78-which themselves fell squarely
·within the domestic relations exception-Younger abstention principles required it to decline jurisdiction.79 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court in an unpublished opinion holding that the
lower court "correctly declined to exercise jurisdiction over this case
by invoking the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction" as
well as general abstention principles.80
Carol Ankenbrandt appealed, and tl1e Supreme Court granted
certiorari. The Court limited review to the following questions: "(1) Is
there a domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction? (2) If so,
does it permit a district court to abstain from exercising diversity
jurisdiction over a tort action for damages? (3) Did the District Court
in this case err in abstaining from exercising jurisdiction under the
doctrine of Younger v. Harris?"81 In reviewing the Fifth Circuit decision,
the Supreme Court held that the domestic relations exception did not
75136 u.s. 586 (1890).
76 L.R. v. Richards, No. 89-4244, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17068, at *2-3 (E.D. La. Dec. 10,
1990) (quoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890)), affd without opinion sub nom.,
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 934 F.2d 1262 (5th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2206 (1992).
77 L.R., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17068, at *3.
78 Carol Ankenbrandt continuously represented that, because of the alleged abuse, a Louisiana juvenile court had terminated her former husband's parental rights and had also permanently enjoined him from contact with the children. In reaching a determination on the merits,
none of the reviewing courts found it necessary to address the accuracy or implications of her
representations.
79 L.R., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17068, at *3-5 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)).
For a detailed discussion of Younger v. Harris, see text infra accompanying notes 164-66.
80 Ankenbrandt v. Richards, No. 91-3037 (5th Cir. May 31, 1991) (unpublished opinion on
file with the author), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2206 (1992).
81 SeeAnkenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 855, 855 (citation omitted).
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bar the district court from accepting jurisdiction over the suit and that
the Eastern District of Louisiana had therefore erred in abstaining.82
The Court said that, although "technically dicta," the statements
made in Barber formed the basis for exempting divorce, alimony, and
custody decree cases from federal diversity jurisdiction.83 The Court
observed that the Barber Court did not rely on the constitutional
boundaries of Article III, Section 284 in justifying the exception. Instead, the Barber majority had grounded the limitation upon the narrower language of the Judiciary Act of 1789,85 whose defining phrase
"all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity" remained a "key
element" demarcating the terms of diversity jurisdiction prior to congressional replacement of the operative language in 1948 with the term
"all civil actions."86 Because the amendment was presumed to have
been enacted "with full cognizance" of the Court's nearly century-long
exception for core cases, the Court held that the extended passage of
time without expression of congressional dissatisfaction reflected con-

82 On remand from the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded the case to
the district court for further proceedings. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, No. 91-3037 (5th Cir.
Aug. 13, 1992) (unpublished opinion on file with the author).
83 See Ankenbrandt, 112 S. Ct. at 2208. The diversity statute as enacted in 1789 read as follows:
"[T]he circuit courts shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of several states,
of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity .... " Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 11, 1 Stat.
73, 78. The federal diversity statute was amended in 1948 to provide that diversity jurisdiction
extends to "all civil actions." Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1332, 62 Stat. 930 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988)). The present diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, provides
in pertinent part that:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $50,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and is between( I) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state ....
28 u.s.c. § 1332 (1988).
84 In pertinent part, Article ill, § 2 of the Constitution provides that: "The judicial Power
shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; - to all Cases
... between Citizens of different States ...."u.s. CONST. art. m, § 2. Much has been written
about what exactly these phrases mean. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of
Article m: Separating the Two Tiers ofFederal jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REv. 205 (1985); Lawrence
G. Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authurity to Regulate the jurisdiction of
t/ze Federal Courts, 95 HARv. L. REv. 17 (1981). A more complete bibliography is set forth infra
note 300. Extensive literature also exists on the history of Article ill. See generally Robert N.
Clinton, A Mandatory Vzew ofFederal Court jurisdiction: A Guided Q}lest for the Original Understanding ofArticle III, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 741 (1984); Wythe Holt, "To Establish justice": Politics,
tlzejudiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 Dmm LJ. 1421 (1989).
85 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78.
86 Ankenbrandt, 112 S. Ct. at 2212 (citing 1948 Judicial Code and Judiciary Act, ch. 646, 62
Stat. 930 (1948) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988))).
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gressional approval of a domestic relations exception for such actions. 87
Although the Court acknowledged that the Barber majority had not
expressly referred to the diversity statute's limitation on "suits of a civil
nature at common law or in equity, "88 it reasoned that the Barber
majority's silence as to the dissent's reasoning could fairly be inferred
to mean that the majority's reasoning rested on the same basis.89 With
respect to Carol Ankenbrandt, however, the Court allowed her to
pursue a tort action in federal court because her lawsuit did not seek
a divorce, alimony or custody decree. 90 The Court did not, however,
enunciate any guiding principles for lower courts to follow in making
future determinations.91
Finally, the Court ruled that the district court erred in positing
the doctrine of Younger abstention as an alternative ground for its
holding, "because the federal courts have a 'virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them.' "92 The Court also
surmised that future cases involving elements of the domestic relationship, even when the parties do not seek divorce, alimony or child
custody, might implicate Burfard abstention. For example, this occurs
when a case presents "difficult questions of state law bearing on policy
problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends
the result of the case then at bar. ''93 Under such circumstances, "it may
be appropriate for the court to retain jurisdiction to insure prompt
and just disposition of the matter upon the determination by the state
court of the relevant issue.''94

87 !d.

at 2215; see also Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 842, 843 (1st Cir. 1981) ("[T]he exception has
endured for too long for us to abandon it in the absence of contrary action by Congress or the
Supreme Court."); Cherry v. Cherry, 438 F. Supp. 88, 90 (D. Md. 1977) ("[T]he court is unwilling
to increase the workload of this already overburdened court by ignoring a rule that has existed
for over 100 years without any intimation of Congressional disapproval.").
Professor Martin Redish has criticized this approach to federal jurisdiction by commenting
that it "often seems irrelevant that something is being done incorrectly, as long as it has been
done incorrectly long enough." Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and
the Interpretive Process: An "Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 761, 801-03 (1989).
Although I share Professor Redish's frustration, barring either Supreme Court reversal or con·
gressional revision, lower courts are bound by such declarations.
88 Ankenbrandt, 112 S. Ct. at 2206.
89 Id. at 2213.
90 Id. at 2215.
91 Id.
92 Id.

(quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
(1976)). Specifically, the district court had erred in relying on abstention principles because the
Supreme Court had never before applied notions of comity under circumstances '\vhen no state
proceeding was pending nor any assertion of important state interests made." !d. at 2216 (citing
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)).
93 Ankenbrandt, 112 S. Ct. at 2216 (quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814).
94 Id. at 2216 n.8.
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Justice Blackmun concurred in the result reached by the majority
while strenuously criticizing its reasoning. 95 Addressing the majority's
statutory interpretation, Justice Blackmun stated that, despite the majority holding that § 1332 provides an exception for cases involving
divorce, alimony, or child custody, "no such exception appears in the
statute. ''96
Justice Blackmun reasoned instead that the statute unambiguously
extended district court jurisdiction to "all civil actions" between diverse
parties meeting the requisite amount in controversy requirement. He
said that he had "great difficulty" with the maJority's approach because
statutory language is ordinarily "conclusive" absent a "clearly expressed" intention to the contrary.97 He could, therefore, "not see how
a language change that, if anything, expands the jurisdictional scope
of the statute can constitute evidence of approval of a prior narrow
construction. ''98 Congressional failure to refer expressly to domestic
relations matters when amending the diversity statute proved at most
that Congress did not realize § 1332 contained a domestic relations
exception.99
In addition, Justice Blackmun expressed the view that the "longstanding" federal court practice of refusing to hear core domestic
relations cases is "precedent at most for continued discretionary abstention,"100 which would provide a more "principled basis" for federal
court disinclination to entertain domestic relations matters. 101 He did
not, however, elaborate on the circumstances in which abstention
might apply in the future. Finally, Justice Blackmun cautioned that
given the Court's construction of the phrase "common law or equity"
to exclude divorce, alimony, and custody matters, the majority "casts
grave doubts" upon the viability of such cases arising under Article III's
grant of federal question jurisdiction over cases "in Law and Equity." 102

95 Id.

at 2217 (Blackmun,J., concurring).
96Jd.
97 Id. at 2217 (citing Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980)).
98 Ankenbrandt, 112 S. Ct. at 2217 (Blackmun,J., concurring).
99 I d.; see al5o Daniel]. Meltzer, The judiciary's Bicentennia~ 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 423, 435 (1989)
(noting that Congress ordinarily "has not been very attentive to legislation concerning the
judiciary. It took nearly eight years for Congress to relieve the Justices of their circuit riding
duties.").
100 Ankenbrandt, 112 S. Ct. at 2217 (Blackmun,J., concurring).
101 Id. at 2221; see al5o id. at 2221 n.9 ("As this Court has previously observed that the various
types of abstention are not 'rigid pigeonholes,' there is no need to affix a label to the abstention
principles I suggest." (quoting Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 n.9 (1987))).
102Jd. at 2221 n.8 (citing U.S. CONST. art. ill,§ 2).
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Also concurring in the Court's judgment, Justice Stevens noted
that, regardless of individual views of the scope or application of the
domestic relations exception, Ankenbrandt "should be an exceedingly
easy case" because none of the Justices believed that the exception
applied to the case at bar. 103 Accordingly, Justice Stevens stated that, he
''would leave for another day consideration of whether any domestic
relations cases necessarily fall outside of the jurisdiction of the federal
courts and of what, if any, principle would justify such an exception to
federal jurisdiction."104
While the Supreme Court's decision in Ankenbrandt failed toestablish sufficiently clear standards for federal courts to address domestic relations cases and resolve their conflicting approaches, logical
extension of Ankenbrandts reasoning indicates that federal court jurisdiction extends to all cases not expressly included in its interdiction.
Regardless of what may be read from Justice Stevens's concurrence,
the Court granted certiorari to explore the question of a domestic
relations exception to federal jurisdiction and proceeded to exclude
only certain core cases.
The Court's reaffirmation of a domestic relations exception to
federal jurisdiction is also a narrowing one, prohibiting only "grants
of divorce, alimony and child custody decrees." This concentration
divides the category of core cases into two subcategories: (1) the
granting of divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees ("primary core
cases") and (2) all other cases in the core category ("secondary core
cases"). Secondary core cases include proceedings for guardianship,
affiliation, emancipation, truancy, neglect, abuse, adoption, and delinquency, as well as applications for name change and orders of protection. The Ankenbrandt opinion is entirely silent about the viability of
federal adjudication of core enforcement cases. This silence is surprising in light of the fact that Barberitselfis a core enforcement case. By
not including secondary core and core enforcement cases among
those prohibited by its interpretation of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and
its subsequent amendments, the Court's ruling strongly implies that
federal courts will have jurisdiction over these two categories of cases,
provided they meet diversity or other jurisdictional requirements.
The Court's remand of Carol Ankenbrandt's tort suit to the Eastern District of Louisiana on the grounds that it did not seek a primary
core determination clearly demonstrates federal jurisdiction over domestic tort cases, even though the Court declined to delineate any
103 Id.
104

Id.

at 2222 (Stevens and Thomas,JJ., concurring).
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guidelines for future lower court review. Moreover, even if the phrase
"in Law and Equity" in the constitutional context has the same force
as does "common law or equity" in the statutory context, such a limitation at most serves only to exclude primary core determinations from
federal review. Hence, federal jurisdiction exists for all other suits
seeking redress for violations of constitutional rights. Finally, although
the Court suggested that Burford abstention could be appropriate in
future domestic relations cases, it did not explain how such abstention
would apply. A proposal for this type of abstention is set forth below. 105
The majority of the domestic relations cases rendered after Ankenbrandt have cited that decision for the proposition that core cases are
excluded from federaljurisdiction. 106 At the same time, a small number
of cases relying upon Ankenbrandt have discretely applied abstention
principles. 107 Yet, to date, no court has attempted to explain the parameters of the domestic relations exception following Ankenbrandt.
This lack of explanation is especially glaring as to Ankenbrandfs abstention components. Indeed, individual courts-even within the same
circuit-seem confused regarding the application of abstention principles in this context. For example, one district court judge dismissed
a child custody determination because it was beyond the court's jurisdiction, 108 while a second judge of the same court both abstained from
and dismissed the same type of action for lack of jurisdiction.109 A

105 See
106

infra notes 169-224 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Wrightv. Long, No. 93-1727, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 2431 (7th Cir. Feb. 7, 1994)

(precluding core cases under domestic jurisdictional exception); Gragg v. Nebraska, No. 93-4191SAC, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7330 (D. Kan. May 17, 1994) (determination of child custody decree
was within domestic relations exception to jurisdiction); Mitchell v. Cronin, 92 Civ. 7360 (KMW),
1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14590 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 1993) (only applying domestic relations exception
to core cases and thus allowing plaintiff to amend her complaint in order to prosecute § 1983
action); Ernst v. Children & Youth Servs. of Chester County, Civ. Action No. 91-3735, 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12173 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 1993) (interpreting domestic relations exception as only
excepting core cases from federal jurisdiction); Cahanin v. Tobias, Civ. Action No. 92-4097 Sec.
"D" (6}, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1111 (E.D. La. Feb. 3, 1993) (domestic relations exception
precludes reevaluation of child support judgment).
107 See, e.g., Minot v. Eckhardt-Minot, 13 F.3d 590 (2d Cir. 1994); Nwankwo v. Nwankwo, No.
92-1624, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 32222 (1st Cir. Dec. 9, 1992); Lannan v. Maul, 979 F.2d 627,
630-31 (8th Cir. 1992); Tierra Child v. Stangler, No. 92-0850-CV-W-6, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19954
(W.D. Mo. Dec. 28, 1992).
lOS See Greig v. Supreme Court of New York, 93 Civ. 8210 (MBM), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17114 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 1993).
109 SeeDurrv. Mobley, 92 Civ. 8349 (SS}, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4601 (S.D.N.Y. Aprill2, 1993).
The approach taken in Greig, has met with favor in other circuits. See, e.g., Kahn v. Kahn, 21 F.3d
859 (8th Cir. 1994) (federal suit between former spouses based on former marital assets was
precluded on basis of domestic relations exception rather than deferred on abstention principles); Lee v. Washington, No. 91-36277, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 2687 (9th Cir. Oct. 7, 1992)
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proposal setting the parameters of a coherent abstention doctrine
modelled after Ankenbrandt is set forth below in Part II. C.
II.

SETTING THE PARAMETERS OF jURISDICTION AND ABSTENTION IN
DOMESTIC RELATIONS CASES

This Part considers the issue of whether and how federal courts
might exercise jurisdiction in non-primary core cases. Section A reviews the debate between advocates of mandatory jurisdiction and
scholars who support judicially created exceptions to the assertion of
federal court jurisdiction. Section B sets forth the existing abstention
doctrines and considers their applicability to domestic relations matters. Section C proposes a new form of abstention based on the Anlwnbrandt decision.
A. The Debate Between Mandatory Jurisdiction and Equitable Restraint
If federal district courts have jurisdiction over non-primary core

cases, are they required to exercise the full extent of that authority? In
other words, must federal courts hear all cases that fulfill statutorily
created jurisdictional requirements, or may they decline jurisdiction
through the equitable doctrine of abstention? 110 This issue is the subject of a significant and unresolved debate among several august federal courts scholars. Although definitive resolution of that controversy
is beyond the scope of this Article, it is a question that must be
addressed if the new form of abstention proposed below is to be
considered.
Over a century ago, in Cohens v. Vi1ginia, 111 Chief Justice John
Marshall observed that: "We have no more right to decline the exercise
of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.
The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution. "112 This
(holding that lack ofjurisdiction rather than abstention was appropriate reason for district court's
dismissal of suit based on child custody).
110 The discussion in this Section excludes subject matter areas where Congress has specifically prohibited federal court adjudication. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988) (Tax Injunction
Act) ("The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection
of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts
of such State."); 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988) Qohnson Act) ("The district courts shall not enjoin,
suspend or restrain the operation of, or compliance with, any order affecting rates chargeable
by a public utility .... "); 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1988) (Anti-Injunction Act) ("A court of the United
States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly
authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or
effectuate its judgments.").
m19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
112 I d. at 404.
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premise, which has gained standing through repetition, 113 is the mainstay of a federal courts philosophy of mandatory jurisdiction whose
followers believe that federal courts must adjudicate all cases within
their jurisdictional purview.
The chief proponent of the mandatory jurisdiction theory is Professor Martin Redish, who utilizes a separation-ofpowers model. 114 Professor Redish argues that our constitutional democracy vests the unrepresentative judiciary with the power to invalidate statutes enacted
by a representatively elected legislature. By extension, those democratic principles "clearly prohibit"115 federal courts from "openly ignor[ing] a legislative judgment on any ground other than unconstitutionality."116 Consequently, discretionary jurisdictional doctrines such
as abstention amount to insupportable "usurpations" of legislative
authority. 117
In addition to Professor Redish, Professors Robert Clinton, 118 Donald Doernberg119 and Donald Zeigler120 support the mandatory jurisdiction theory. Professor Clinton exhaustively surveys the legislative
m See, e.g., Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922) (where plaintiff invokes
federal jurisdiction federal court is "bound to take the case and proceed to judgment"); Mondou
v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 223 U.S. 1, 58 (1912) ("existence ofjurisdiction creates an implication
of duty to exercise in; Board ofComm'rsv. Aspinwall, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 376, 385 (1861) (federal
courts may not tum away claimants who have satisfied jurisdiction and process requirements);
Hyde v. Stone, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 170, 175 (1857) (district courts cannot abdicate their duty to
adjudicate all properly brought actions). For a recent, non-Supreme Court case, see Burns v.
Watler, 931 F.2d 140, 145 (1st Cir. 1991) ('Turning to· the merits, we begin by noting that the
principle that federal courts are obligated to determine a case once federal subject matter
jurisdiction has been properly invoked was established early in the history of our system of
courts."). An equally famous extension ofjustice Marshall's statement in Cohenswas announced
in the abstention context. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800, 817 (1976) (Federal courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the
jurisdiction given them."); see also Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193 (1988) (quoting Colorado
River, 424 U.S. 800).
114 See Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the judicial
Function, 94 YALE LJ. 71 (1984) [hereinafter Redish, Separation of Powers]. See generally Martin
H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation ofJudicial Business Between State and Federal Courts: Federal
jurisdiction and the "Martian Chronicles", 78 VA. L. REv. 1769 (1992) [hereinafter Redish, Martian
Chronicles]; Martin H. Redish, Judge-Made Abstention and the Fashionable Art of "Democracy Bashing", 40 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 1023 (1990) [hereinafter Redish, Democracy Bashing]; Martin H.
Redish, The Doctrine ofYounger v. Harris: Deference in Search of a Rationale, 63 CoRNELL L. REv.
463 (1978) [hereinafter Redish, Younger Deference].
115 Redish, Separation of Powers, supra note 114, at 73.
116 Id. at 74.
117 See

id. passim.
generally Clinton, supra note 84.
119 See generally Donald L. Doemberg, "You Can Lead A Horse to Water • . . ": The Supreme
Court's Refusal to Allow the Exercise of Original Jurisdiction Conferred by Congress, 40 CAsE W. REs.
118 See

L. REv. 999 (1990).
120 See generally Donald H. Zeigler, A Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine in Light of the
Legislative History of Reconstruction, 1983 DuKE LJ. 987 (1983).
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history of Article III to prove that the Framers contemplated mandatory jurisdiction. 121 Also relying on legislative history, in this case of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 122 as interpreted by the Supreme Court in
Mitchum v. Foster, 123 Professor Zeigler asserts that federal courts occupy
a position of "primacy" in the adjudication of cases arising under their
auspices. 124 Professor Doernberg, in turn, emphasizes the lack of textual and historical support for the Supreme Court's refusal to exercise
its original jurisdiction.I25
In contrast to the mandatory jurisdiction school of federal courts
theory, several federal courts scholars argue that federal courts are
empowered with the necessary discretion to assert or decline jurisdiction. The most renowned of these commentators, Professor David
Shapiro, 126 maintains that discretion is a time-honored component of
grants ofjurisdiction, with roots in both common law and equity. Thus,
rather than being an untenable usurpation of the legislative function,
"open acknowledgement of reasoned discretion is wholly consistent
with the Anglo-American legal tradition "127 and lends itself to effectual
rules for governing federal court jurisdiction. 128

121 See Clinton, supra note 84, passim.
122Ch. 22, §I, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)).
123407 u.s. 225, 242 (1972).
124 See Zeigler, supra note 120, passim; see also David P. Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected
Defense, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 317 (1978) ("There was no excuse for the Mitchum decision."); Aviam
Soifer & H.C. Macgill, The Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 Thx. L. REv. 1141,
1170-72 (1977) (intimating that Justices Marshall and Story were skeptical about state court
ability to protect federal rights); Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Relationship
Between State and Federal Courts: A Critique ofMichigan v. Long, 59 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1118
(1984) (same). Other commentators take the position that the Constitution is inherently neutral
as to forum. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Parity as a Constitutional Question, 71 B.U. L. REv. 645
(1991); Martin H. Redish, Supreme Court Review of State Court "Federal" Decisions: A Study in
Interactive Federalism, 19 GA. L. REv. 861 (1985); Michael Wells, Behind the Parity Debate: The
Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in the Law ofFederal Courts, 71 B.U. L. REv. 609 (1991).
125 See Doemberg, supra note 119, passim.
126 See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543 (1985) [hereinafter
Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion]; see also David L. Shapiro, Reflections on the Allocation of

Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts: A Response to "Reassessing tlze Allocation ofJudicial
Business Between State and Federal Courts", 78 VA. L. REv. 1839 (1992) [hereinafter Shapiro,
Reflections].
127 See Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, supra note 126; see also Gene R. Shreve, Federal
Injunctions and the Public Interest, 51 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 382, 388-98 (1983) (offering traditional
reasons for denying equitable relief).
125 Professor Shapiro proposes that (I) equitable discretion, (2) federalism and comity, (3)
separation of powers, and (4) judicial administration provide the "appropriate criteria for chan·
neling discretion in matters of jurisdiction." See Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, supra note
126, at 579 & passim.
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In addition to Professor Shapiro, Professors Ann Althouse, 129 Jack
Beermann,130 Barry Friedman131 and Michael Wells132 have argued for
the necessity of discretion. Professor Althouse points out that mandatory jurisdiction theory both neglects and relies upon statutory interpretation by the judiciary to argue that it is "treasonous" for federal
courts to decline jurisdiction. 133 Professor Beermann suggests that Professor Redish's thesis is grounded in outdated notions regarding the
separation of powers that fail to account for the modern "shared
powers" view. 134 Contrary to Professor Clinton, Professor Friedman
asserts that Article III lacks sufficient textual support to maintain a
theory of mandatory jurisdiction.135 Finally, Professor Wells maintains
that, contrary to Professor Ziegler's view, Congress left the boundaries
of § 1983 to the judiciary.136
In addition to the above criticisms of mandatory jurisdiction offered by these academic scholars, three insightful criticisms of the
theory have been offered by attorney James Rehnquist. 137 First, Mr.
Rehnquist points out that ChiefJustice Marshall's statement in Cohens
is dictum: 138 the Court in Cohenswas deciding the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court and not original district court jurisdiction. Thus,
if the Cohens Court created any "obligation" to hear cases, that obligation only applied to the Supreme Court itself and not to the lower
federal courts. Second, Mr. Rehnquist observes that the logical extension of Professor Redish's theory would make "treasonous" any federal
court exercise of jurisdiction not explicitly authorized by Congress. 139
129 See Ann Althouse, The Humble and the Treasonous: Judge-Made Jurisdiction Law, 40 CAsE
W. REs. L. REv. 1035, 1041-46 (1990).
130 See Jack M. Beermann, "Bad" judicial Activism and Liberal Federal-Courts Doctrine: A
Comment on Professor Doernberg and Professor Redish, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1053, 1061-66
(1990).
131 See Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (1990).
132 See Michael Wells, Why Professor Redish is Wrong About Abstention, 19 GA. L. REv. 1097
(1985).
133 See Althouse, supra note 129, passim.
134 See Beermann, supra note 130, passim.
135 See Friedman, supra note 131, passim.
136 See Wells, supra note 132, passim.
137 The reasoning is set forth in Mr. Rehnquist's excellent article. See James C. Rehnquist,
Taking Comity Seriously: How To Neutralize The Abstention Doctrine, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1049, 1102-03
& n.303 (1994).
138 It seems profoundly ironic that in both the Barber and Cohens decisions it was dicta that
engendered so much difficulty.
139 See Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809) ("The duties
of this court, to exercise jurisdiction where it is conferred, and not to usurp it, where it is not
conferred, are of equal obligation.").
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Such a view would have invalidated pendent jurisdiction prior to enactment of§ 1367,140 as well as the ability of federal courts to dispose
of various collateral issues after their jurisdiction has technically expired.141 Third, Professor Redish's assertions to the contrary, Congress
does in fact delegate jurisdictional discretion to the district courts. One
instance of this delegation occurs whenever Congress enacts legislation
without explicitly setting forth a limitations period. 142
B. Recognized Abstention Doctrines

Attractive as the purity of mandatory jurisdiction may be in the
abstract, abstention is very much a reality. The Supreme Court has
recognized four 143 primary abstention doctrines, 144 each of which is
140 See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); see also Moore v. New York
Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 607-10 (1926) (ancillary jurisdiction).
141 See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393-98 (1990).
142 See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143 (1987) (applying a
four-year limitation period to civil RICO claims).
143 See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813-17 (1976).
See generally Law Enforcement Ins. Co. v. Corcoran, 807 F.2d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 1986); Bethpage
Lutheran Servs., Inc. v. Weicker, 777 F. Supp. 1093, 1098 n.5 (D. Conn. 1991), affd, 965 F.2d
1239 (2d Cir. 1992); Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Oklahoma ex reL Comm'rs. of Land Office,
760 F. Supp. 1466, 1474 (D. Okla. 1991); 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE§ 4241, at 28 (2d ed. 1988). Not all courts agree with this categorization, and a
good deal of intellectual energy has been spent attempting to identifY the actual number of
abstention doctrines. See, e.g., Cox v. Planning Dist. I Community Mental Health & Mental
Retardation Serv. Bd., 669 F.2d 940,942 (4th Cir. 1982); Smith v. Metropolitan Property and Liab.
Ins. Co., 629 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1980); Sederquist v. City of Tiburn, 590 F.2d 278, 280 (9th Cir.
1978); Empire Distribs. of N.C. v. Schieffiin & Co., 677 F. Supp. 847, 854 (D.N.C. 1988).
144 See generally AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF jURISDICTION BE·
TWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, OFFICIAL DRAFT AND COMMENTARY (1969); Ann Althouse,
The Misguided Search for State Interest in Abstention Cases: Observations on the Occasion ofPennzoil
v. Texaco, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1051 (1988) [hereinafter Althouse, Misguided Search]; Ann Althouse,
How to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State Power, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1485 (1987)
[hereinafter Althouse, Separate Sphere]; Committee on Federal Courts of the New York State Bar
ASsociation, Report on the Abstention Doctrine: The Consequences ofFederal Court Deference to State
Court Proceedings, 122 F.R.D. 89 (1988); Martha A. Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The
Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071 (1974); Barry Friedman, A
Revisionist Theory of Abstention, 88 MICH. L. REv. 530 (1989); Philip B. Kurland, Toward a
Co-operativejudicial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481 (1959); Linda
S. Mullenix, A Branch Too Far: Pruning the Abstention Doctrine, 75 GEO. LJ. 99 (1986); Redish,
Separation ofPowers, supra note 114; Rehnquist, supra note 137; David L. Shapiro, Abstention and
Primary jurisdiction: Two Chips Off the Same Block?-A Comparative Ana~sis, 60 CORNELL L. REv.
75 (1974); Wells, supra note 132; Kelly D. Hickman, Note, Federal Court Abstention in Diversity of
Citizenship Cases, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 1237 (1989); Patrick]. Smith, Note, The Preemption Dimension
of Abstention, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 310 (1989). Although a complete bibliography of abstention
articles is beyond the space constraints of this Article, the above list represents some of the more
significant contributions to the field.
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named after the case in which its principles were first enunciated: 115
(1) Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co. ("Pullman abstention"), 146 (2)
Burford v. Sun Oil Co. ("Burford abstention"), 147 (3) Younger v. Harris
("Younger abstention"),148 and (4) Colorado River Water Conservation
District v. United States ("Colorado River abstention"). 149 Each of these
seminal cases, discussed in chronological order below, has been followed in turn by secondary cases which have sought, with varying
degrees of success, to explicate and apply the jurisdictional boundaries

145 There are also equitable precursors to the formal abs1ention doctrine cases. See, e.g.,
Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935) (barring exceptional circumstances a
federal court sitting in equity will not interfere with a state crinrinal prosecution); Pennsylvania
v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176 (1935) (federal equity court will not appoint a liquidating receiver when
state procedure existed); Gilchristv. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U.S. 159 (1929) (federal
court deference to state court interpretation of complex regulatory scheme); Fenner v. Boykin,
271 U.S. 240 (1926) (only exceptional circumstances warrant federal court staying state officials
from commencing criminal prosecution). For a more complete collection of these cases, see
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 333 n.29 (1943); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
496, 500-01 (1941).
146 312 U.S. at 501. See generaUy Thomas G. Buchanan, Pullman Abstention: Reconsidering the
Boundaries, 59 ThMP. L.Q. 1243 (1986);julieA. Davies, Pullman and Burford Abstention: ClarifYing
the &les of State and Federal Courts in Constitutional Cases, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1 (1986);
Theodore B. Eichelberger, Certification Statutes: Engineering a Solution to Pullman Abstention
Delay, 59 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1339 (1984); Field, supra note 144; Keith Werhan, Pullman
Abstention After Pennhurst: A Comment on judicial Federalism, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 449
(1986).
147 319 U.S. at 334. See generaUy MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL jURISDICTION: ThNsiONS IN THE
ALLocATION OF juDICIAL PoWER 243-49 (1980); Davies, supra note 145; David M. Liebenthal, A
Dialogue on England: The England Case, Its Effect on the Abstention Doctrine, and Some Suggested
Solutions, 18 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 157 (1966); Charles S. Treat, Abstention lTy Federal Courts in
Suits Challenging Administrative Decisions: The Scope of the Burford Doctrine, 46 U. CHI. L. REv.
971 (1979); Gordon G. Young, Federal Court Abstention and State Administrative Law From Burford
to Ankenbrandt: Fifty Years of judicial Federalism Under Burford v. Sun Oil Co. and Kindred
Doctrines, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 859 (1993). Professor Gordon Young's article is by far the most
comprehensive of the above cited references.
148 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See generaUy George D. Brown, Dealing With Younger Abstention as a
Part ofFederal Courts Reform: The &le of the Vanishing Proposa~ 1991 B.Y.U. L. REv. 987 (1991);
George D. Brown, When Federalism and Separation of Powers Collide: Rethinking Younger Abstention, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 114 (1990); David Mason, Slogan or Substance? Understanding "Our
Federalism" and Younger Abstention, 73 CoRNELL L. REv. 852 (1988); Redish, Younger Deference,
supra note 114; Howard B. Stravitz, Younger Abstention Reaches A Civil Maturity: Pennzoil Co. v.
Texaco Inc., 57 FoRDHAM L. REv. 997 (1989); Georgene M. Vairo, Making Younger Civil: The

Consequences ofFederal Court Deference to State Court Proceedings-A Response to Professor Stravitz,
58 FoRDHAM L. REv. 173 (1989); Zeigler, supra nole 120.
149 424 U.S. 800, 817-19 (1976). See generaUy Robert H. Abranxs, Reserved Water Rights, Indian
Rights and the Narrowing Scope ofFederal Jurisdiction: The Colorado River Decision, 30 STAN. L.
REv. 1111 (1978); Charles M. Elliott & Kenneth Balcomb, Deference to State Courts in the Adjudication of Reserved Water Rights, 53 DEN. LJ. 643 (1976); Mullenix, supra no1e 144; David A.
Sonenshein, Abstention: The Crooked Course of Colorado River, 59 TuL. L. REv. 651 (1985);
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of abstention. 150 Burford abstention has propagated corollaries in Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern Railway,151 Louisiana Power
& Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 152 New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v.
Council of New Orleans, 153 and most recently, Anken!Jrandt. 154 Because
this Article will show that Burford type abstention is the most pertinent
to domestic relations matters, each of the Burford corollaries is addressed at length in Section C below. 155
1. Pullman Abstention
In Pullman, the Supreme Court first coined the term "abstention"
to describe a district court's refusal to exert its jurisdiction. 156 Under
Pullman, federal courts may postpone hearing cases over which they
have jurisdiction if resolution of an unclear or unconstrued state issue
might avoid a constitutional question, 157 even in the absence of a

Comment, Federal Court Stays and Dismissals in Deference to Parallel State Court Proceedings: The
Impact ifColorado River, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 641 (1977).
150 See, e.g., New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989)
(delineating Burfortfs administrative prong); Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schs.,
Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 627-28 (1986) (extending the scope of Younger abstention to state administrative proceedings); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983)
(establishing a six prong balancing test for determining the existence of "exceptional circumstances" under Colorado Riverabstention);Judice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (applying Younger
to state civil contempt proceedings); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375
U.S. 411,415-17 (1964) (allowing Pullman-abstained cases to return to federal court for post-state
court resolution of remaining federal issues); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 369
U.S. 134, 135-36 (1962) (extending Pullman abstention to suits at law); Louisiana Power & Light
Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29-30 (1959) (applying Burford abstention to a state court
proceeding); Interstate Material Corp. v. City of Chicago, 847 F.2d 1285, 1288 (7th Cir. 1988)
(adding an additional four factors for consideration of Colorado River abstention).
151341 u.s. 341, 345-50 (1951).
152360 U.S. at 29-30.
153 491 U.S. at 361.
154 See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206, 2215-16 (1992).
l55 See infra text accompanying notes 169-213.
156 See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941); see also Zwickler v. Koota,
389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967) (describing abstention as a 'judge-made doctrine ••. first fashioned"
in Pullman). The term "abstention" appears in Supreme Court opinions eight times prior to the
Pullman decision, but never in the context ofjurisdictional refusal. See Young, supra note 147, at
869 n.45.
157 See Pullman, 312 U.S. at 501. In Pullman, black porters challenged the constitutionality
of a Texas Railroad Commission order requiring railway sleeper cars to be supervised by conductors, who were all white. The Court held that the district court should have abstained from the
case so it could be resolved by a Texas state court. See id. at 497-98. As Professor Martha Field
has aptly noted, the underlying rationale of Pullman is questionable at best, because the state law
question was neither complex nor unclear. See Field, supra note 144, at 1078 nn.22-23. In
addition, Pullman marked a departure from general federal courts practice that when issues arc
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pending state proceeding. 158 Although originally applied to a request
for equitable relief, 159 Pullman has been enlarged to include suits at
law. 160 Under Pullman, unless a litigant voluntarily submits her federal
claims for state court determination, she reserves the right to submit
or relitigate federal issues of law with the abstaining district court. 161
2. Burford Abstention
Although delineated in greater detail below, the basic tenet of
Burford abstention is that federal courts will not adjudicate complex
state law questions that are related to state administrative procedures. 162
The outer boundaries of the Burford abstention doctrine are unclear,
because subsequent cases extend Burford to state judicial proceedings.
Like Pullman abstention, Burford does not require a pending parallel
state action. Unlike Pullman, when jurisdiction is ceded to the state
court system under Burford, litigants are usually barred from returning
to federal fora. 163
decided on nonconstitutional grounds-a fairly routine occurrence-the alternative resolution
is determined by the federal court. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288
(1936); Siler v. Louisville & N.RR, 213 U.S. 175 (1909).
Federal court avoidance of constitutional issues has been debated by several august scholars.
See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME CoURT AT
THE BAR OF PoLITICS (1962); Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues": A Comment
on Principle and Expediency in judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1964); Shapiro, jurisdiction
and Discretion, supra note 126.
158 See Pullman, 312 U.S. at 501-02 (holding that, in the absence of a pending state action,
one should be brought while the federal court retained jurisdiction over the federal claim).
159 See id. at 497.
160 SeeFornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41 (1970) (contract action); United Gas Pipe Line
Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134, 135-36 (1962) (contest over municipal sales tax); Clay v.
Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960) (contract suit).
161 See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415-17 (1964).
The underlying rationale of the England decision is peculiar enough to warrant attention. The
district court ordered the federal plaintiff to adjudicate his federal claim in state court under
opaque state law rather than in federal court under fairly well established constitutional principles. The claimant was then given the option of returning to federal court if he was still dissatisfied
with the result of state adjudication after exhausting all available appellate avenues. See id. at
414-17. It was perhaps for this reason that justice William 0. Douglas, a member of the unanimous Pullman Court, mused, while concurring in the result, that "Pullman from the start seemed
to have some qualities of a legal research luxury." Id. at 425.
The stalling of proceedings has been a major criticism aimed at the Pullman doctrine. See,
e.g., David P. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute: Part II, 36 U. CHI. L. REv.
268, 317 (1969); Kurland, supra note 144, at 489. For a general evaluation of England, see
Liebenthal, supra note 147.
162 See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 334 (1943).
163 See, e.g., American Bank & Trust Co. v. Dent, 982 F.2d 917, 922 n.5 (5th Cir. 1993);
Brandenburgv. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1195 n.18 (4th Cir. 1988); Griffin Hosp. v. Commission on
Hosps. & Health Care, 782 F.2d 24, 25 n.1 (2d Cir. 1986).
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3. Younger Abstention
The Younger abstention doctrine originally prohibited federal
courts from enjoining ongoing state court criminal proceedings. 164 1t
has now been expanded, in certain instances, to both civil and administrative actions brought by states in their own tribunals. 165 Subsequent
to Younger abstention, criminal defendants may use habeas corpus
proceedings to return to federal court after their state court convictions.166
4. Colorado River Abstention
In Colorado River, the United States Supreme Court held that
federal courts may abstain from hearing cases when the parties seek coterminous resolution in the respective state courts and
the federal courts are presented with "truly unusual" facts. 167
164SeeYoungerv. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,41 (1971).
165 See, e.g., Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schs., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 627-28
(1986) (state administrative proceedings);Judice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (state civil contempt
proceedings); see also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987); Middlesex County Ethics
Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982).
166 See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 463-65 (1965); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 420-22
(1963). Professor Young has noted that, "given recent limitations on federal habeas corpus
actions, the consequences of Younger abstention" preclude federal reevaluation. See Young, supra
note 147, at 872 & n.70 (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311-12, 316, 318-21 (1989);
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 495 (1976)). See generally
Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARv.
L. REv. 441 (1963); Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas
Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE LJ. 1035 (1977); Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60
N.Y.U. L. REv. 991 (1985); Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REv.
1038 (1970).
167 See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817-19 (1976).
In Colorado River, the United States brought an action against some 1,000 water users seeking a
declaration of its rights to Colorado river water under both federal and state statutory law. Shortly
afterward, one of the defendants attempted to join the United States in a pending state administrative proceeding wherein the United States's rights could be determined. See id. at 806. When
the United States was joined in the state proceeding, the federal defendants succeeded in
persuading the district court to abstain from hearing the case. The Tenth Circuit reversed the
district court only to be reversed in turn by the Supreme Court. See id. To assist future lower
court consideration of whether abstention was warranted, the Court listed six factors for consideration, including the "clear federal policy" of "avoiding piecemeal adjudication." See id. at 819.
In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), the Court
revisited its Colorado River decision. This time, the Court held that abstention was not warranted
due to the absence of "exceptional circumstances." /d. at 16. In an attempt to clarif}' its ruling,
the Court set forth a balancing test that included the following six factors: (1) assertion of
jurisdiction; (2) federal forum inconvenience; (3) avoidance of piecemeal litigation; (4) temporal
primacy ofjurisdiction; (5) applicability of the forum's law; and (6) state court ability to protect
federal rights. See id. at 15-16.
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Colorado River abstention normally precludes federal forum relitigation.168
C. Appl:ying Abstention Principles to Non-Primary Core Domestic

Relations Cases
1. Applying Buiford Abstention to Domestic Relations Cases

When examining the validity of abstaining from domestic relations
cases, federal courts have relied upon each of the Pullman, 169 Buiford,I 70
Younger 71 and Colorado River 72 abstention doctrines. Several courts
have also abstained from hearing domestic relations matters without
referring to a specific abstention doctrine, relying instead on a general
principle that federal courts decline jurisdiction over domestic relations cases.173 Although cases arising under any of the individual abstention doctrines may present valid reasons for federal court abstention, the Buiford line of cases is the most pertinent to the domestic
relations context because it allows federal courts to defer to state courts
Professor Linda Mullenix has been highly critical of the Court's approach, commenting that
the Court's articulation of factors "amounts to little more than a laundry list. ... Vrrtually no
meaning, analysis, or content is given to these factors." See Mullenix, supra note 144, at 119. By
contrast, the Seventh Circuit has added four additional factors for consideration, increasing the
complexity of the Coloradc River/Moses H. Cone balancing test. See Interstate Material Corp. v.
City of Chicago, 847 F.2d 1285, 1288 (7th Cir. 1988).
168 But see Mahaffey v. Bechtel Assocs. Professional Corp., 699 F.2d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Evans
Transp. Co. v. Scullin Steel Co., 693 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1982); Keiser v. Anne Arundel County
Dep't of Social Servs., 679 F.2d 1092, 1094 (4th Cir. 1982).
169 See, e.g., Lynk v. LaPorte Superior Court, 789 F.2d 554, 567-69 (7th Cir. 1986).
17° See, e.g., Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1014
(1982); Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1982); lloyd v. Loeffier, 694 F.2d 489 (7th
Cir. 1982); Diaz v. Diaz, 568 F.2d 1061, 1062 (4th Cir. 1977); Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim &
Bailon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509,515-16 (2d Cir. 1973); Bell v. Bell, 411 F. Supp. 716,718 (W.D.
Wash. 1976).
171 See, e.g., Parker v. Turner, 626 F.2d 1, 8 (6th Cir. 1980); Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d
625, 633 (6th Cir. 1978); Williams v. Williams, 532 F.2d 120, 122 (8th Cir. 1976); Neustein v.
Orbach, 732 F. Supp. 333, 341-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); DeWyse v. Smith, 535 F. Supp. 952, 956 (W.D.
Mich. 1982); Brown v.Jones, 473 F. Supp. 439, 447-52 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
172 See, e.g., Friends of Children, Inc. v. Matava, 766 F.2d 35, 36-37 (1st Cir. 1985); Keiser, 679
F.2d at 1094; Acord v. Parsons, 551 F. Supp. 115 (W.D. Va. 1982); Zaubi v. Hoejme, 530 F. Supp.
831, 834 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
173 See, e.g., Congleton v. Holy Cross Child Placement Agency, Inc., 919 F.2d 1077, 1079 (5th
Cir. 1990); Ingram v. Hayes, 866 F.2d 368, 369-70 (lith Cir. 1988); Goins v. Goins, 777 F.2d 1059,
1063 (5th Cir. 1985); Peterson v. Babbitt, 708 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir. 1983); Wilkins v. Rogers,
581 F.2d 399, 404 (4th Cir. 1978); Bossom v. Bossom, 551 F.2d 474, 475-76 (2d Cir. 1976);
Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1968); Short ex reL Oosterhous v. Short, 730 F.
Supp. 1037, 1039-40 (D. Colo. 1990); Smith v. Pension Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp., 715 F.
Supp. 715, 718 (W.D. Pa. 1989); Daniels v. Stovall, 660 F. Supp. 301, 304 (S.D. Tex. 1987); Beliveau
v. Beliveau, 655 F. Supp. 478,479 (D. Me. 1987); Cook v. Winters, 645 F. Supp. 158, 159-60 (S.D.
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in areas of traditional state court expertise. 174 In the remainder of this
Article, I will first explain why the Court's reasoning in Ankenbrandt
demonstrates that Burford abstention principles may apply to non-primary core domestic suits, and will then delineate the parameters for
Burford-type abstention in this area.l 75
2. A Closer Examination of Burford and Its Progeny
In 1943, only two years after Pullman, the Texas Railroad Commission was once more a principal in an abstention case before the
Tex. 1986); Bates v. Bushen, 407 F. Supp. 163, 164 (D. Me. 1976); LaMontagne v. LaMontagne,
394 F. Supp. 1159, 1160-61 (D. Mass. 1975); Bacon v. Bacon, 365 F. Supp. 1019, 1021 (D. Or.
1973). Two Fifth Circuit cases have even upheld this principle in strongly worded dicta when the
facts of the individual suits did not themselves merit abstention. Seejagiella v.Jagiella, 647 F.2d
561, 566 (5th Cir. 1981); Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486, 487 {5th Cir. 1978).
I74 See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (1992); see also Nasser v. City of
Homewood, 671 F.2d 432, 439-40 (11th Cir. 1982) (describing Burford abstention as "perhaps
the most potent device" for declining jurisdiction). The scope of Burford abstention is not,
however, unlimited. For example, Burford abstention has been held not to bar civil rights
litigation. See, e.g., Association for Retarded Citizens ofN. Am. v. Olson, 713 F.2d 1384, 1391 (8th
Cir. 1983) ("Cases involving questions of civil rights are the least likely candidates for abstention."); United States v. Puerto Rico, 764 F. Supp. 220, 226 (D.P.R. 1991) (holding abstention
"particularly inappropriate in civil rights cases" (quoting Association of Relatives & Friends of
AIDS Patients v. Regulations & Permits Admin., 740 F. Supp. 95, 102 (D.P.R. 1990))).
175 Before explicating the relevance of Burford abstention, it bears noting why the other
abstention doctrines are less appropriate than Burford in the domestic relations context.
Pullman abstention requires federal courts to abstain from hearing cases that state courts
can resolve by applying state law in a manner that relieves federal courts from making constitutional determinations. However, because federal question cases usually raise constitutional issues
that are beyond the scope of related core issues, a federal court abstaining under the Pullman
doctrine \viii not ordinarily be able to have constitutional issues resolved through other means
by a state court. At best, a district court may abstain in order to facilitate state adjudication of
everything lmt the constitutional issues. Although such action is entirely valid-indeed it parallels
the proposal set forth below-it is not in accord \vith the goals established by Pullman.
Similarly, although it is often mentioned, Younger abstention is not germane to the domestic
relations exception because it generally prohibits federal courts from enjoining ongoing state
court criminal, civil, and administrative proceedings. The thrust of domestic relations cases is
therefore inapposite to Younger abstention. Federal courts are more than willing to allow state
courts to resolve cases \vith domestic underpinnings and are thus unlikely to hinder state court
litigation in favor of their own determination. But see Parker v. Turner, 626 F.2d 1, 8 (6th Cir.
1980); Neustein v. Orbach, 732 F. Supp. 333, 341-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); DeWyse v. Smith, 535 F.
Supp. 952, 956 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
Finally, because Colurado River abstention is contingent upon "exceptional circumstances"
presenting "truly unusual" facts which in the past have focused on the geographical disparity of
large numbers of parties, Colurado River issues are unlikely to arise in the context of domestic
disputes. But see Friends of Children, Inc. v. Matava, 766 F.2d 35, 36-37 (1st Cir. 1985); Keiser v.
Anne Arundel County Dep't of Social Servs., 679 F.2d 1092, 1094 (4th Cir. 1982); Acord v. Parsons,
551 F. Supp. 115 (W.D. Va. 1982); Zaubi v. Hoejme, 530 F. Supp. 831, 834 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
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Supreme Court. In Burford, 176 the Sun Oil Company filed suit in federal
court challenging the legitimacy of a Texas Railroad Commission ruling that allowed a rival oil company to drill and pump oil wells on a
commonly held oil field. 177 Sun Oil's claim could have been brought
in Travis County court, which routinely exercised review over the
Commission's rulings. 178 Instead, a federal action was brought under
both diversity and federal question jurisdiction, asserting the invalidity
of the Commission's ruling on both state statutory and federal constitutional grounds. 179 The three-judge district court dismissed the suit,
and Sun Oil appealed.
Upholding the district court, the Supreme Court described the
Texas courts as ''working partners with the Railroad Commission in the
business of creating a regulatory system for the oil industry" that
should be allowed unimpeded exercise of their expertise. 180 Although
the Court did not characterize the Texas courts' judicial input into the
Commission's decisions as either judicial or legislative,I 81 by affirming
the district court the Supreme Court directed any further action by
Sun Oil to the Travis County court. 182
While the Court did not elaborate on the abstention principles set
forth in the Pullman decision, it did cite Pullman as support for denying injunctive relief in order to defer to a state's public policy interest:
Equity's discretion to decline to exercise its jurisdiction may
be applied when judicial restraint seems required by considerations of general welfare. "Courts of equity may, and frequently do, go much farther both to give and withhold relief
in furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to go when only private interests are involved."183
Although some courts have interpreted Burford to apply only to
administrative cases, commentators have pointed out that the Court
176Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 334 (1943).
id. at 315-17.
178 See id. at 325-26.
179 See id. at 316-17.
180 See id. at 326.
181 See Burford, 319 U.S. at 325-26.
182 In fact, following district court dismissal of i!s suit, Sun Oil obtained the exact relief in
state court that it had sought from the federal forum. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 186 S.W.2d 306
(Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
183 Id. at 333 n.29 (quoting Vrrginian Ry. v. System Fed'n, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937) ); see also
Silverman v. Barry, 727 F.2d 1121, 1124 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stressing sensitivity to state policy
as justifying abstention).
177 See
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has not clearly delineated the circumstances under which Burford
abstention is appropriate. 184 Professor Gordon Young posits that,
although state interestjustified abstention in Burford, "the administrative nature of the state law ... tipped the scales."185 I believe
Professor Young's conclusion is correct. As justice Felix Frankfurter
observed, even scholars at the time of the Burford decision treated
administrative law as "exotic. "186 The Court may have therefore been
inclined to let states sort out this "exotic" area of law on their own.
Moreover, the bright line drawn by requiring the presence of
administrative action in order to invoke Burford abstention is no longer
operative. The fine work of Professors Richard Fallon and Daniel
Meltzer has demonstrated that the line between law making and law
application is now severely blurred. 187 The opinions of several courts
reflect this blurring. For example, in Planned Parenthood League v.
Bellotti,188 the First Circuit held that Burford suggests abstention even
when the state agency is the judiciary,189 and at least two other First
Circuit decisions have followed that reasoning. 190 Similarly, the Second
Circuit seems to have abrogated any connection with state administrative proceedings for Burford abstention. 191 The Fifth Circuit has determined in DuBroff v. DuBroff that Burford abstention is appropriate in
domestic relations cases because "there is perhaps no state administra-

184 See WRIGHT ET

AL., supra note 143, at§ 4241, pp. 10-11; see all"o Field, supra note 144, at
1157 (writing prior to both the NOPSI and Ankenbrandt decisions that lower courts were not
limiting Buiford abstention to cases in which there was a single avenue of state judicial review).
185 See Young, supra note 147, at 886.
186 See Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REv. 614, 615 (1927).
187 See Richard H. Fallon,Jr. & DanielJ. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity and Constitutional
Remedies, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1733, 1756-64 (1991).
188 868 F.2d 459 (1st Cir. 1989). Citations in this and the immediately following footnotes arc
based upon Professor Young's research. See Young, supra note 147, at 901-02 and accompanying
notes.
189 See Planned Parentlwod, 868 F.2d at 464 (emphasizing "a federal court's responsibility to
avoid usurping a state's authority to supervise its own administrative body, in this case the state
judiciary as it implements regulations of minors' abortions").
190 See Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass. Inc., 592 F.2d 1191, 1194-95 (1st Cir. 1979) (Burford
abstention appropriate from antitrust suit where state agency proceeding in question was state
insurance commission approval of medical supply contract); Barryv. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 555 F.2d 3, 13 (1st Cir. 1977) (Buiford abstention fitting in consumer suit over insurance
premiums because the action ''would affect the state's ratemaking machinery and policies").
191 See, e.g., West v. City of Morrisville, 728 F.2d 130, 134-35 (2d Cir. 1983) (deferring to an
administrative order that had not been directly challenged); Pineman v. Oechslin, 637 F.2d 601,
602 (2d Cir. 1981) (challenge to state employees benefit statute); Smith v. Property & Liab. Ins.
Co., 629 F.2d 757, 758-61 (2d Cir. 1980) (insurance policy beneficiary's attempt to recover
proceeds); Brown v. First Nat'! City Bank, 503 F.2d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 1974) (abstaining in dispute
regarding banking statute despite lack of any administrative scheme).
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tive scheme in which federal court intrusions are less appropriate than
domestic relations law. "192
The Supreme Court revisited Burford eight years after its original
decision in yet another case involving a railroad litigant. In Alabama
Public Service Commission v. Southern Railway, the Court reversed a
district court exercise of jurisdiction on abstention grounds. 193 In Alabama Public Service, the Southern Railway Company challenged a state
commission decision denying its petition to discontinue a certain service line. As in Burford, although a state court remedy existed, the
railroad sought to enjoin the state commission in federal court. 194
Emphasizing the "primary authority" of the states over intrastate rail
operations, the Court reversed the district court in favor of abstention.195 The Court's ruling evoked not only sensitivity to a peculiarly
local concern, but also deference to the state court that would ultimately resolve the railroad's challenge. Alabama Public Service therefore acceded not only to administrative law concerns, but also to the
province of state court determination of an issue of state public policy.
After another eight-year interval, the Supreme Court, in Louisiana
Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 196 revisited the Burford line of
abstention cases. 197 In Thibodaux, the Court upheld a district court's
decision to abstain from hearing an eminent domain proceeding that
also could have been initiated in state court. 198 In an opinion authored
by Justice Frankfurter, the Court reasoned that issues of unclear state
law so "intimately involved with sovereign prerogative" justified the
district court's abstention. 199

192 833 F.2d 557, 561-62 (5th Cir. 1987). This decision was apparently (and ironically)
overlooked by the Ankenbrandt appellate decisions.
193341 u.s. 341, 345-51 (1951).
194 See id. at 342-43.
195 See id. at 345.
196 360 U.S. 25, 29-30 (1959). See generaUy Note, Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of
Thibodaux, 69 YALE LJ. 643 (1960); Note, Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 44
MINN. L. REv. 1015 (1944).
197 See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976)
(suggesting that Thibodaux abstention is a subset of Burford abstention). Professor Young has
posited the inverse. Namely, tlJat Burford (and by implication, Ankenbrandt) are subsets of the
generally larger Thibodaux doctrine. See Young, supra note 147, at 940-46. My position is that
Burford abstention really has two prongs, one requiring administrative action and the other which
does not require administrative action, and that the gap between the two, paralleling the gap
between law-making and law-finding, has narrowed considerably.
198 See Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 28--29.
199 I d. Justice Frankfurter performed a leading role in the development of abstention theory.
See generaUy Note, Federal-Qpestion Abstention: Justice Frankfurter's Doctrine in an Activist Era, 80
HARV. L. REv. 604 (1967).
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Thibodaux reinforced the Alabama Public Service Court's expansion of Buiford abstention to include deference to state courts outside
the administrative context because of sensitivity to state public policy
concerns. While Alabama Public Service deferred to the "primary
authority" of states,200 Thibodaux yielded to an area "intimately involved
with sovereign prerogative. "201 In both of these cases-as in Burfordrthe Court recognized that the underlying actions could have been
initiated in state court and that each of these cases had the practical
effect of returning the matters to the respective state courts. 202
Thirty years after Burford, the Supreme Court re-examined abstention from cases involving state administrative agency action in New
Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of New Orleans (''NOBS/'?. 203 In
NOPSI, the plaintiffs challenged a ratemaking decision of the New
Orleans City Council in federal court, asserting that an earlier Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission ruling preempted the Council's ruling. The district court refused to exercise jurisdiction for several reasons, including Buiford abstention. The Fifth Circuit affirmed and the
plaintiffs appealed. 2°4
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit, declining to apply
Burford abstention because, inter alia, federal adjudication of the preemption claim "would not disrupt the State's attempt to ensure uniformity in the treatment of an 'essentially local problem.' "205 The Court
explained that, pending available state court review, Burford abstention
was proper:
( 1) when there are "difficult questions of state law bearing on

policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar;" or (2)
where the "exercise of federal review of the question in a case
and in similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts to
establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern."2°6
NOPSI, therefore, stands for the proposition that "talismanic connections between a federal case and a state's administrative process will
200 See Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 345 (1951).
2o1 See Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 28-29.
2o2 See Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 29; Alabama Pub. Serv., 341 U.S. at 342-43.
203491 u.s. 350 (1989).
204 Id. at 358.
205 Id. at 362 (quoting Alabama Pub. Serv., 341 U.S. at 347).
206 Id. at 361 (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800, 814 (1976)).
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no longer justify abstention under Burford."207 Supporting this reading
is the fact that when NOPSI describes the second prong under which
Burford abstention is possible-"state efforts to establish a coherent
policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern"208-it is
in fact using the same language that the Colorado River Court used
when describing the state court proceedings in Thibodaux. 209
Finally, in Ankenbrandt,210 the Supreme Court continued this pattern of expansion when it held that Burford abstention principles could
apply to federal suits presenting "difficult questions of state law bearing
on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance
transcends the result of the case then at bar"211 or "involving elements
of the domestic relationship" which "depended on a determination of
the status of the parties. "212 In a footnote, the Court added that when
applying Burford abstention "it may be appropriate" for the district
court to retain jurisdiction over the case in order "to [e]nsure prompt
and just disposition of the matter" after state court determination. 213
Ankenbrandt therefore signifies another solidification of the line of
cases under Burford in which administrative action is not a prerequisite
for federal court deferral to state interests.
3. Applying Ankenbrandt Abstention to Domestic Relations Cases
The majority of cases to cite the Ankenbrandt decision do so for
the proposition that primary core cases are excluded from federal
jurisdiction.214 At the same time, a small number of cases relying upon
Ankenbrandt have separately applied discrete principles of that case.
Although none of these courts has attempted to explain the parameters of the domestic relations exception, each may be understood to
develop a different aspect of the decision. The relevant cases in this
group are:
207Young, supra note 147, at 909.
208 New Orleans, 491 U.S. at 361.
209 See Col1Jrado River, 424 U.S. at 814.
210 Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206 (1992).
211 Id. at 2216 (quoting Colm"ado River, 424 U.S. at 814).
212 Id. at 2216.
213 Id. at 2216 n.8.
21 4 See, e.g., Wrightv. Long, No. 93-1727, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 2431 (7th Cir. Feb. 7, 1994)
(precluding core cases under the domestic jurisdictional exception); Gragg v. Nebraska, No.
93-4191-SAC, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7330 (D. Ks. May 17, 1994) (determination of a child custody
decree was within the domestic relations exception to jurisdiction); Mitchell v. Cronin, 92 Civ.
7360 (KMW), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14590 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 19, 1993) (only applying the domestic
relations exception to core cases and thus allowing a plaintiff to amend her complaint in order
to prosecute a§ 1983 action); Ernst v. Children & Youth Servs. of Chester County, Civ. Action
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(1) Greigv. Supreme Court of New York, 215 dismissing an action
for child custody and a protection order for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction;216
(2) Nwankwo v. Nwankwo, 217 holding that domestic tort actions could proceed in federal court "unless abstention is
otherwise required ... to avoid interference with ... important questions of state policy;"21S
(3) Lannan v. Maul, 219 declaring a breach of contract action
not sufficiently enmeshed in either domestic relations or ongoing state controversy to invoke the core exception or the
proper use of abstention;22°
(4a) Minot v. Eckhardt-Minot, 221 upholding a district court's
decision under Buiford to abstain from and remand a case
involving the tort of custodial interference, on the ground
that it was a difficult area of law not yet developed by the state
courts;222 and
(4b) Farkas v. D 'Oca, 223 abstaining under Buiford from a core
matrimonial action while also maintaining jurisdiction over a
No. 91-3735, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12173 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 1993) (interpreting the domestic
relations exception as only excepting core cases from federal jurisdiction); Cahanin v. Tobias,
Civ. Action No. 92-4097 Sec. "D" (6), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1111 (E.D. La. Feb. 3, 1993) (domestic
relations exception precludes reevaluation of child support judgment).
215No. 93 Civ. 8210 (MBM), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17114 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 1993).
216 !d.; see also Kahn v. Kahn, 21 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 1994) (federal suit between former spouses
based on former marital assets was precluded on basis of domestic relations exception rather
than deferred on abstention principles); Lee v. Washington, No. 91-36277, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS
2687 (9th Cir. Oct. 7, 1992) (holding that lack ofjurisdiction rather than abstention was appropriate reason for district court's dismissal of suit based on child custody). But see Durr v. Mobley,
92 Civ. 8349 (SS), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4601 (S.D.N.Y. Aprill2, 1993) (both abstaining from
and dismissing because of lack of jurisdiction, a child custody and support action).
217 No. 92-1624, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 32222 (1st Cir. Dec. 9, 1992).
218Jd.
219979 F.2d 627 (8th Cir. 1992).
220 Id. at 630-31. But see Carla K. Heathershaw, Note, A New Interpretation of the Domestic
Relations Exception in the Eighth Circuit: Lannan v. Maul, 27 CREIGHTON L. REv. 853, 873 (1994)
(arguing that the Eighth Circuit erred in the Lannan decision because "it found that the
[domestic relations] exception could not apply in a contract case"). Ms. Heathershaw's assertion
is based on a flawed reading of the Lannan decision. The Eighth Circuit never held that contracts
were exempt from the federal court adjudication. Instead, the Lannan court held that the
particular facts of the case at bar were not themselves enmeshed sufficiently in either the former
spouses' domestic relations or an ongoing state controversy to invoke the core exception. See
Lannan, 979 F.2d at 630-31.
22113 F.3d 590 (2d Cir. 1994).
222 Id. at 594. The Second Circuit asserted that "the only significant recent New York State
case even considering these sorts of claims is Harley v. Harley, 565 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1991), appeal
dismissed, 584 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1992), and it does not illuminate the status under New York law of
the torts alleged" in the case at bar. Id. at 594 n.2.
223857 F. Supp. 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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related RICO claim based on a fraudulent scheme to defraud
the former spouse of marital assets. 224
Collectively, the principles that emerge from these cases are that:
(1) primary core cases lack jurisdiction and should be dismissed;
(2) non-primary core cases raising secondary core case issues
have jurisdiction, but are appropriate for abstention;
(3) non-primary core cases that raise standard state law questions have jurisdiction and should be heard;
( 4) when non-primary core cases raise both primary core and
non-primary core issues, the court should dismiss the primary
core issue and (a) abstain from the non-primary core issue
raising unique state law questions, and (b) adjudicate the
standard law issues.
In sum, under Ankenbrandt abstention, federal courts would abstain from hearing all secondary core cases as well as actions raising
difficult issues of unresolved state law. The reasons justifying the jurisdictional contours of Ankenbrandtabstention are explicated in the next
Part.

Ill.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR HEARING NON-PRIMARY CoRE
DOMESTIC RELATIONS CAsES

Federal courts have offered several policy reasons for declining to
hear domestic relations cases arising under the diversity statute.225
These rationales include special state interest and expertise, disdain
toward family law, and federal docket congestion. As demonstrated
below, countervailing policies favoring federal court adjudication of
non-primary core actions outweigh each of these considerations. These
countervailing policy considerations include the growing national nature of family law, traditional diversity concerns of averting prejudice
toward out-of-state claimants, the general institutional duty of courts
to adjudicate cases within their purview, and the protection of federal
rights. Interwoven with this analysis are prudential concerns of federalism, comity and parity.
224Id.
225 See generaUy Poker, supra note 24, at 149 ("Although many courts doubt the validity of the
constitutional and statutory rationales for th.e domestic relations exception, they frequently offer
policy considerations to justify the exception .... "); Note, Federal Jurisdiction-Diversity of Citizenship-Validity of a Foreign Divorce Decree, 54 IowA L. REv. 390, 394-95 (1968) (approving
considerations that decline jurisdiction).
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A. Non-Primary Core Diversity Cases

1. Special State Interest and Expertise
One policy reason proffered by federal courts for not hearing
domestic relations cases is that states have developed a special interest
and expertise in their adjudication. 226 Specifically, district courts maintain that domestic relations cases address "local" concerns227 of special
interest to the individual states,228.and that because of this interest the
states have provided their judiciaries with attendant social service agencies.229 As a result, federal courts claim that state courts have developed
an expertise for domestic cases230 which are thus "peculiarly unsuited
226 Cases are repeated in the following footnotes as a way of illustrating that district courts
rely upon the same rationales, often citing them verbatim from other jurisdictions. This illustrates
that the exception is more a rote maxim than a well thought out doctrine. See generally DetJelopments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1156, 1198 (1980).
227 See, e.g., Drewes v. Ilnicki, 863 F.2d 469, 471 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting that the exception
"continues to the present day because the field of domestic relations involves local problems");
lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 1982) (federal courts "are not local institutions");
Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510,515-16 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982) (recognizing
that f.unily law is peculiarly local, the federal courts continue to adhere tenaciously to the
judge-made rule that excepts most domestic relations cases from the diversity jurisdiction);
McCullough ex reLJordan v. McCullough, 760 F. Supp. 613, 616 (E.D. Mich. 1991) ("The field
of domestic relations involves local problems ....");Taylor v. Wettstein, 746 F. Supp. 713, 716
(S.D. Ohio 1989) ("It is axiomatic that the field of domestic relations involves local problems
....");Yelverton v. Yelverton, 614 F. Supp. 528, 529 (N.D. Ind. 1985) ("[D]omestic relations
matters, being oflocal concern, are best left to the jurisdictional province of state courts.").
228 See, e.g., Fernos-Lopez v. Figarella Lopez, 929 F.2d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 1991) (crediting "the
strong state interest in domestic relations"); Vaughan v. Smithson, 883 F.2d 63, 65 (1Oth Cir. 1989)
("the states have a strong interest in domestic relations matters"); Raftery v. Scott, 756 F.2d 335,
343 (4th Cir. 1985) ("the state through its courts has a stronger and more direct interest in the
domestic relations of its citizens than does the federal court"); Ruffalo ex reL Ruffalo v. Civiletti,
702 F.2d 710, 717 (8th Cir. 1983) ("federal courts have consistently refused to entertain diversity
suits involving domestic relations" because of "the strong state interest in domestic relations
matters"); CSIBI v. Fustos, 670 F.2d 134, 136-37 (9th Cir. 1982) ("States have an interest in family
relations superior to that of the federal government ....");Ellison v. Sadur, 700 F. Supp. 54, 55
(D.D.C. 1988) ("This exception is largely grounded in the belief that state courts have a particularly strong interest ... in resolving disputes involving family relationships."); Tuerffs v. Tuerffs,
117 F.RD. 674 (D. Colo. 1987) (noting the "state's strong interest in domestic relations cases").
229 See, e.g., Fernos-Lopez, 929 F.2d at 22 (acknowledging tlte state courts' "ability to provide
ongoing supervision, the availability there of professional support services"); Vaughan, 883 F.2d
at 65 (domestic "disputes often require ongoing supervision"); Rykers v. Alford, 832 F.2d 895,
899-900 (5th Cir. 1987) (domestic "disputes often require ongoing supervision"); Lloyd, 694 F.2d
at 493 (the federal courts "do not have staffs of social workers"); Donnelly v. Donnelly, 515 F.2d
129, 130 (1st Cir. 1975) (yielding to "the power and the resources of state family courts");
McCullmlgh ex reL Jordan, 760 F. Supp. at 616 (because of administrative machinery, domestic
cases are "peculiarly suited to state regulation and control").
230 See, e.g., Fernos-Lopez, 929 F.2d at 22 (praising "the relative expertise of state courts");
Vaughan, 883 F.2d at 65 (the states "have developed an expertise in settling family disputes");
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to control by the federal courts. "231 Moreover, district courts disavowing
jurisdiction caution that federal adjudication raises the danger of
conflicting federal and state decrees. 232
The reasoning of courts averring special state interest in domestic
relations is flawed in a number of respects. First, it rests on the notion
that "neither the Constitution nor laws of the United States [are] seen
as affecting the family unit."233 This view cannot be countenanced in
light of the reality of federal law's involvement with the family. Indeed,
"a complex mosaic of federal regulation of economic and social relations now overlays state laws" of domestic relations. 234 To be convinced
of this assertion, one need only view the plethora of federal legislation235 and constitutionallitigation236 that affects members of the familial unit and their respective rights.
Next, to the extent that special state interest extends to domestic
relations cases, this interest exists only for primary and secondary core
Rykers, 832 F.2d at 899-900 ("the state courts have greater expertise and interest in domestic
matters"); Ruffalo ex reL Ruffalo, 702 F.2d at 717 (federal courts should yield to "the competence
of state courts in settling family disputes"); Lwyl, 694 F.2d at 493 ("[T]he normal responsibilities
of federal judges [do not] give them the experience they would need to be able to resolve
domestic disputes with skill and sensitivity."); Fustos, 670 F.2d at 136-37 ("[S]tate courts have
more expertise in the field of domestic relations."); McCullough ex reL Jordan, 760 F. Supp. at 616
("state courts have developed a proficiency and expertise in these cases"); EUison, 700 F. Supp.
at 55 (recognizing that the state courts "have developed special competence" in domestic matters); Tuerffs, 117 F.R.D. at 675 ("the competence of state courts to settle [domestic] disputes").
231 Firestone v. Cleveland Trust Co., 654 F.2d 1212, 1215 (6th Cir. 1981); see also Vaughan,
883 F.2d at 65 (adjudicating domestic disputes is "a task for which the federal courts are not
suited"); Lloyd, 694 F.2d at 493 ("the federal courts are not, as a matter of fact, competent
tribunals to handle" domestic relations cases); Donnelly, 515 F.2d at 130 ("the federal court is ill
equipped to determine family obligations").
232 See, e.g., Femos-Lopez, 929 F.2d at 22 (fearing "the undesirability of potentially incompatible federal and state decrees in this area"); Vaughan, 883 F.2d at 65 ("federal adjudication of
such disputes increases the chances of incompatible or duplicative federal and state court
decrees"); Rykers, 832 F.2d at 899-900 ("piecemeal adjudication of such disputes increases the
chance of different court systems handing down incompatible decrees"); Ruffalo ex reL Ruffalo,
702 F.2d at 717 (cautioning against "the possibility of incompatible federal and state court
decrees"); Tuerffs, 117 F.R.D. at 675 ("the possibility of conflicting federal and state court decrees
preclude this court from assuming jurisdiction").
233 Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303, 307 n.17 (3d Cir. 1984).
234 Resnik, supra note 10, at 1750.
235 See, e.g., Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 § 8(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1988);
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-28, 670-79a (1988); Child
Abuse and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-06 (1988); Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
and Adoption ReformActof1978, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5111-14 (1988); Family Violence Prevention and
Services Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10401-15 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Victims of Child Abuse Act of 1990,
42 U.S.C. §§ 13001-41 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
236 See, e.g., Orr v. Orr 440 U.S. 268, 274-84 (1979) (ruling that gender-specific alimony
statute was unconstitutional); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 380 (1978) (holding unconstitutional a state statute that restricted people with child support obligations from marrying); Loving
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cases that comprise the state regulation abstained from under An/lenbrandt, i.e., the granting of divorce, alimony or custody decrees. Beyond core issues, unless a case raises a difficult issue of unresolved state
law-also abstained from under Ankenllrandt-it cannot be distinguished from other areas concurrently adjudicated by federal and state
courts. Additionally, if state expertise exists in non-primary core matters, it is only because federal courts have not been given the opportunity to hear such cases. At the same time, because "federal courts
have acquired a considerable expertness in the interpretation and
application of federal law, "237 it can be argued that a concurrent federal
expertise exists over certain domestic cases.
Finally, after Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,
[i]n all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction
solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the
outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court. 238
Thus, federal judges should apply state domestic law in as uniform
a manner as state judges, while also ensuring the preservation of a
uniform state system of regulation.
2. Bias Against Hearing ''Family Law" Matters
Also underlying federal court reluctance to adjudicate domestic
relations matters is a bias against "family law" issues,239 which are often
perceived as being ''beneath" the proper scope of federal considerav. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7-12 (1967) (striking down state ban of interracial marriages); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (recognizing right of parents to "direct [their
children's] destiny" and "the liberty ... to direct [their] upbringing and education" even when
those decisions deviate from cultural norms); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1922) (acknowledging parental right to "bring up children"); see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Parents have a Fourteenth Amendment protected
fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody and management of their children. See Santosky
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977);
Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977); see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
651-52 (1972) (parental rights outweigh those "liberties which derive merely from shifting
economic arrangements" (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring))); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("[T]he custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."),
237 AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, STUDY OF TilE DIVISION OF jURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND

164-68 (1965).
238326 u.s. 99, 109 (1945).
239 Professor Barbara Wand first made the assertion that federal courts have a "distaste" for
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tion. 24°For example, federal courts that have declined jurisdiction over
domestic relations matters have described them as "vexatious, "241 "little
family quarrel[s],"242 "intra-family feuds," 243 and "imbroglio[s]"244 that
"embroil"245 and "enmesh"246 the courts in cases that require their
delving into "sordid evidence"247 and "trading in wares from the foul
rag-and-bone shop of the heart. "248 Indeed, at least one judge has
openly acknowledged that domestic relations cases are "particularly
distasteful,"249 and that "exploring a thicket of state decisional law" is
a ''waste" of time250 of which federal courts should allow state courts
the "dubious honor exclusively. "251
In her study of the interrelationship between women and
federal courts and the role that gender plays in allocating work
between the state and federal court systems,252 Professor Judith

domestic matters in 1985. See Barbara Freedman Wand, A CaU for the Repudiation of the Domestic
Relations Exception to Federal jurisdiction, 30 Vu.L. L. REv. 307, 38!Hl6 (1985).
24°Federal judicial elitism extends beyond the realm of family law. See, e.g., Robert Bork,
Dealing with the Overwad in Article ill Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231, 238-39 (1976) (addressing the
National Conference of Causes of Popular Dissatisfuction with Administration ofJustice, Pound
Conference) ("someone fur less qualified than a judge" can adjudicate cases about social security,
food stamps, federal employers' liability, consumer products, and other federal legislation).
241 Thrower v. Cox, 425 F. Supp. 570, 573 (D.S.C. 1976).
242Hinton v. Hinton, 436 F.2d 211, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
243Bacon v. Bacon, 365 F. Supp. 1019, 1020 (D. Or. 1975).
2440verman v. United States, 563 F.2d 1287, 1292 (8th Cir. 1977).
245 LaMontagne v. LaMontagne, 394 F. Supp. 1159, 1161 (1975) (quoting Hemstadt v. Hemstadt, 373 F.2d 316, 318 (2d Cir. 1967)).
24 6 Eberhardt v. Eberhardt, 672 F. Supp. 464, 465 (D. Colo. 1987) (quoting Rogers v. Platt,
814 F.2d 683, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
247Thrower v. Cox, 425 F. Supp. 570, 573 (D.S.C. 1976).
248Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1089 (4th Cir. 1980).
249 See id. at 1087-88; see also Atwood, supra note 25, at 627 ("The domestic relations
exception ..• saves the courts from a distasteful category of litigation.").
250 Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Bailon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509, 516 (2d Cir. 1973).
251 Thrower, 425 F. Supp. at 573. Unfortunately, state courts are as likely to be prejudiced
against women as are their federal counterparts. As reported by the New York Task Force on
Women in the Courts:
[G]ender bias against women . . . is a pervasive problem with grave consequences..•• Cultural stereotypes of women's role in marriage and in society daily
distort courts' application of substantive law. Women uniquely, disproportionately
and with unacceptable frequency must endure a climate of condescension, indifference and hostility.
Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, 15 FoRDHAM URB. LJ. 11, 17-18
(1986-1987).
252 See generally JOAN WALLACH SCOT!", GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF HISTORY 2 (1988)
("[G]ender ... means knowledge about sexual difference ... produced by cultures and societies
of human relationships .•..");BARRIE THORNE ET AL., LANGUAGE, GENDER, AND SociETY:
OPENING A SECOND DECADE OF REsEARCH, IN LANGUAGE, GENDER AND SOCIETY 7, 12-15 (1983)
("gender is not a unitary, or 'natural' fuct, but takes shape in concrete, historically changing social
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Resnik253 posits that underlying federal court disinterest is the association of family law with "private" state controlled law and a corresponding association of federal courts with "public" law such as commerce,
constitutional law, and federal statutory enforcement.254 The assumption that federal courts perform duties central to the nation and thus
beyond the realm of local family law "reiterates the marginalization of
the lives and work of [family issues] in national culture."255 It also bears
noting that the indifference of the federal courts to domestic relations
is reflected by the almost complete absence of the topic from casebooks compiled by federal court commentators. 256
Bias of federal court judges against domestic relations cases does
not provide a valid reason for excising these cases from federal purrelationships"); Christine A. Littleton, Does It Still Make Sense to Talk About "Women"?, 1 UCLA
WOMEN's LJ. 15 (1991) (pointing out some of the shortcomings of gender-neutral language).
253 See generally Resnik, supra note 10, passim. Much of what follows in this Section is derived
from Professor Resnik's excellent work and is indebted to her insight
254 See id. at 1749, 1696.
255 !d. at 1669. Professor Resnik's assertion is borne out not only in the cases cited above,
but also in her description of the attempts to enact the Violence Against Women Act, S. 15, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). Although the Act was enacted after Professor Resnik's article was published, the points she makes are still pertinent In 1991, Congress reviewed legislation intended
to respond to the "'national tragedy' that makes women the victims of violence in homes,
workplaces, and on the street" See Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, THEVIOLENcEAGAINSTWOMEN
ACT OF 1991, S. REP. No. 197, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1991). The Act contained two jurisdictional provisions that would have conferred federal court review. The first provided federal civil
rights remedies to any person who was victimized by a "crime of violence, motivated by gender."
SeeS. 15 at § 301. The second made it a federal crime to travel interstate "to injure, harass, or
intimidate a spouse or intimate partner." See id. at§ 2261. The Judicial Conference of the United
States opposed enactment of the civil rights provisions of the Act, because it felt that conferring
federal jurisdiction would "embroil the federal courts in domestic relations disputes" and "flood
[federal courts] with cases that have been traditionally within the province of the state courts."
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ACT AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE 1,
7 (1991). The Chief Justice also opposed the Act and recommended that Congress heed the
Judicial Conference's advice so that limited federal court time and resources could be "reserved
for issues where important national interests predominate." William H. Rehnquist, Chiefjustice's
1991 Year-End Report on the Federal judiciary, 24 THE THIRD BRANCH 1, 2 {1992).
Although I tend to agree with Professor Resnik, one could argue the opposite position with
much confidence, i.e., that the general tendency to "federalize" local crimes, which are essentially
local activities, removes from the states an area over which they should retain exclusive authority.
Such an assertion would allow federal financial or technological assistance when necessary but
prevent the federal courts from being transformed into police courts, as they already have in the
drug area.
256 SeeDAVID P. CURRIE, FEDERAL CoURT CASES AND MATERIALS {4th ed. 1990); RAY FoRESTER &JoHN E. MoYE, FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed.
1977); PETER W. Low &JOHN CALVIN JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL CoURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERALSTATE RELATIONS (2d ed. 1989); CHARLES T. McCORMICK ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
FEDERAL COURTS (8th ed. 1988). As Professor Resnik has admonished, the
[a]ttitudes of the federal judiciary tmvards family law and towards women's roles in
the federal courts will not shift without self-conscious decisions to reconsider both
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view. The integrity of the judicial system is called into question ifjudges
may state, when presented with domestic matters, simply that they have
more important matters to consider. Moreover, any federal bias is at
least mirrored if not magnified at the state court level257 so that excising
domestic cases from federal review will not abrogate prejudice. Also,
traditional reasons for federal court adjudication support diversity
jurisdiction.258 In addition to notions of comity and federalism set forth
below, the protection of out-of-state litigants from local bias bolsters
the need for federal adjudication. 259
Two venerable commentators have questioned the extent of prejudice against out-of-state litigants both at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution260 as well as in modern times. 261 Specifically, Judge
Henry Friendly argues that protecting creditors from pro-debtor state
courts was an equally strong incentive for the adoption of diversity
past and present. The federal judiciary and its commentators must reclaim the
history heretofore denied about the ongoing relations of the federal courts with
family life.
Resnik, supra note 10, at 1767.
257 See, e.g., JUDICIAL CoUNCIL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS,
ACHIEVING EQUALJUSTICE FOR WOMEN AND MEN IN THE COURTS, DRAFT REPORT, § 4, at 55 (1990)
(judges rate the family law assignment as their lowest preference by a wide margin . . . .");
REPORT OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT GENDER BIAS STUDY COMMISSION 77 (1990) (reporting
judges' strong "dislike" of family law assignments); see also MARYLAND SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE,
GENDER BIAS IN THE CouRTS (1989) (recognizing that domestic relations law experience was less
useful for becoming a judge than was jury trial and criminal prosecution experience); REPORT
OF THE CONNECTICUT TASK FORCE, GENDER, JUSTICE AND THE COURTS 39 (1991) ("Some attorneys felt that because women attorneys ... practiced juvenile or domestic law," they were less
likely to be selected by Judicial Selection Commission for judgeships).
258 See Resnik, supra note 10, at 1761 ('Today's 'buzz' word 'diversity' may have special
meaning within debates about the breadth and role of 'diversity jurisdiction' in that excluding
cases in which domestic relations issues are raised is a way to make 'diversity jurisdiction' less
'diverse.'").
259 See Bank of the United States v. DeVeaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809); Envin
Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of the Federal Courts, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv. 77, 82
(1990) ('The traditional explanation for this branch of federal jurisdiction is the fear that state
courts will favor their citizens over nonresidents."); Cover, supra note 9, at 644 ("diversity jurisdiction is usually justified and explained as a device for avoiding partiality of local tribunals to
local litigants"); John P. Frank, The Case for Diversity jurisdiction, 16 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 403, 406
(1979); Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARv. L.
REv. 49, 83 (1937).
260 See Henry Friendly, The Historic Basis ofDiversity jurisdiction, 41 HARv. L. REv. 483, 493-95
(1928) [hereinafter Friendly, Diversity jurisdiction]; see also HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JuRisDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 139-52 (1973) [hereinafter FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION]. But
see Warren, supra note 259, at 52 (pointing out that Senate Bill!, which later became the Judiciary
Act of 1789, provided for diversity jurisdiction).
261 See CuRRIE, supra note 256, at 7; Larry Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv.
97, 119-21 (1990) (concluding that the classic contention that diversity counterbalanced local
bias is exaggerated).
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jurisdiction.262 Professor David Currie asserts that geographical prejudice has been replaced by more pertinent prejudices.263
Nevertheless, fear of local prejudice remains a real concern in
domestic cases.264 As observed by the Third Circuit:
[Domestic relations] cases truly represent one of the contemporary essential functions of the diversity grant. Here the
specter oflocal bias, a matter of some conjecture in 1787 and
of presumptive dubiety now, surfaces with unfortunate frequency. . . . [They] relate to the interstate arbitral function
for which the federal courts are well suited.265
The necessary enactment of uniform nationwide laws such as the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act266 and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act267 ("PKPA") prove the Third Circuit's allegations of bias. In Thompson v. Thompson the Supreme Court appeared
to recognize the bias potentially inherent in domestic relations
cases.268 The Court noted that jurisdictional deadlocks among states
in child custody cases as well as a nationwide problem of parental
kidnapping underlay a congressional aim in PKPA of extending the
requirements of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to custody determinations.269 Ironically, the Court in Thompson, which addressed a
contentious inter-circuit conflict, held that PKPA did not confer
jurisdiction upon the federal district courts to arbitrate between
conflicting state decrees. 270 Such a ruling calls into question the
usefulness of PKPA, as well as the federal practice of not enforcing
decrees. 271
262 See Friendly, Diversity jurisdiction, supra note 260, at 495-97.
263 See CuRRIE, supra note 256, at 7.
264 See generally William H. Rodgers, Jr. & Linda A. Rodgers, The Disparity Between Due Process
andFullFaith and Credit: The Problem ofthe Samewhcre W!fo, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 1363, 1366 (1967)
(demonstrating prejudice in enforcing divorce decrees); Barbara Stark, Divorce Law, Feminism,
and Psychoanalysis: In Dreams Began Responsibilities, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1483, 1518-20 (1991)
(noting concern about bias in domestic cases).
265 DiRuggiero v. Rodgers, 743 F.2d 1009, 1019 (3d Cir. 1984).
266 9 U .L.A. 116 (1988). See generally Russell M. Coombs, Interstate Child Custody: Jurisdiction,
Recognition, and Enforcement, 66 MINN. L. REv. 711 (1982); Henry H. Foster, Child Custody
Jurisdiction: UCC]A andPKPA, 27 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 297 (1981);JohnJ. Sampson, Wlzat:r Wrong
With the UCC]A l' Punitive Decrees and Hometown Decisions Are Making a Mockery of This Unifonn
Act, FAM. Anvoc., Spring 1981, at 28.
26728 u.s.c. §§ 1901-1963 (1988).
265484 u.s. 174 (1988).
269 Id.
270 Id.

See Chemerinsky & Kramer, supra note 259, at 81-83 (noting that one of the more
important functions of the federal courts is to serve as an umpire in interstate disputes).
27I
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Two examples will suffice to illustrate the contention that out-ofstate claimants are the targets of bias. In Allen v. Allen,272 a husband
brought suit against his wife in state court for breach of a postnuptial
property settlement agreement. Because of the husband's position as
a member of the bar association of the county where the state court
action was initiated, the wife sought to remove the action to federal
court. Despite the wife's apprehension over local bias, the federal court
dismissed the case under the domestic relations exception.273 Similarly,
in Bennett v. Bennett,274 a divorced father brought an action against his
former wife seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief as a result
of the former wife's alleged kidnapping of the parties' child. Preceding
the federal suit were no less than three occasions in which state courts
refused to enforce or declared void pre-existing custody decrees. Nevertheless, the district court held that although it could award damages,
it could not grant injunctive relief. 275
3. Federal Court Congestion
Finally, it is beyond dispute that the federal court workload is
heavy and becoming increasingly more so at a rapid pace.276 Practically
all federal judges agree that their dockets are overcrowded.277 Some
suggested methods to reduce the burden on federal judges include
expanding the federal judiciary,278 raising the minimum amount in
272518 F. Supp. 1234 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
273 !d.

274682 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
275 /d.
276 The Federal judicial Center reports that, in the 30-year period between 1958 and 1988,
the annual number of civil cases commenced in the United States District Courts increased 257%
from 67,115 annual cases to 239,634. See THE FEDERAL APPELLATE JuDICIARY IN THE 21sT
CENTURY 88 (Cynthia Harrison & Russell R. Wheeler, eds., 1989); Harry T. Edwards, The Role of

a judge in Modem Society: Some Reflections on Current Practice in Federal Appellate Adjudication,
32 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 385, 387 (1983) (reporting "an enormously expanding caseload, both in the
quantity of cases heard and the mix of substantive issues"). But see Marc S. Galanter, The Day
After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REv. 3 (1986) (dismissing concerns about the litigation
explosion by comparing gross percentage gains with per capita increases); Marc S. Galanter,

Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About
Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4 (1983) (same).
277 Chemerinsky & Kramer, supra note 259; see also Patricia Wald, Some Thoughts on judging
as Gleaned from One Hundred lears of the Harvard Law Review and Other Great Books, 100 HARv.
L. REv. 887 (1987) ("American judges think of themselves as continuously besieged.").
278 Larry Kramer (Reporter), A Minimal Model and Some Priorities for Federal Jurisdiction, in
1 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS 134 Quly
1, 1990) (Committee's "controversial argument" of "disfavoring increasing the number ofjudges
in the future as a long-term solution in favor of reducing the number of cases allowed in federal
court").
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controversy requirement, 279 eradicating diversity jurisdiction,280 or limiting the types of actions entitled to be brought in 281 or removed to 282

279 See, e.g., Redish, Martian Chronicles, supra note 114, at 1806 (proposing an increase in
the minimum amount in controversy requirement); Charles B. Renfrew, The Problem of Doclwt

Ccntrol: A Response to "Reassessing the Allocation of]udidal Business Between State and Federal
Courts", 78 VA. L. REv. 1833 (1992) (assessing Professor Redish's proposal). See generally William
Wirt Blume, jurisdictional Amount in Representative Suits, 15 MINN. L. REv. 501, 523 (1931)
(discussing the considerations underlying the minimum amount requirement).
280 See, e.g., Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction, 1982: Hearings on H.R. 6691 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration ofJustice of the House Comm. on the
judidary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 336-37 (1982).

The desirability of diversity jurisdiction is the focus of an on-going federal courts debate. In
1968, the American Law Institute ("ALI") proposed excepting domestic relations cases from
federal court review by amending the diversity statute. The proposal was abandoned when ALI's
members were unable to agree on what other areas should also be specifically excepted. See
AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF jURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL CoURTS § 1330 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1968). Because most domestic relations cases are
grounded in diversity jurisdiction, see supra note 7, ALI's proposal would have precluded federal
court review of the majority of non-primary core actions. Most recently, Professor Larry Kramer
conducted a study of diversity jurisdiction as reporter for the Subcommittee on the Role of the
Federal Courts and Their Relations to the States of the Federal Courts Study Committee. Professor Kramer concluded that "abolishing or curtailing diversity jurisdiction should be among the
first steps Congress takes to alleviate workload problems." See Kramer, supra note 261, at 99; see
also Robert C. Brown, The Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts Based on Diversity of Citizens/zip, 78 U.
PA. L. REv. 179 (1929); Frank, supra note 259, at 403;JohnJ. Parker, Dual Sovereignty and the
Federal Courts, 51 Nw. U. L. REv. 407 (1956); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Abolishing Diversity jurisdiction:
Positive Side Effects and Potentialfor Further Reforms, 92 HARv. L. REv. 963 (1979); Robert]. Sheran
& Barbara Isaacman, State Cases Bekmgin State Courts, 12 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1 (1978); Charles
Alan Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Q;lality of State Law, 13 WAYNE L. REv. 317
(1967). For the opinions of one federal judge confronted with diversity cases, see Dolores It
Sloviter, A Federal judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens ofFederalism, 78 VA. L. REv.
1671 (1992).
281 See, e.g., H.R 72, H.R 326, H.R 408, H.R 989, H.R 1335, H.R 2347, H.R. 4756, H.R
Con. Res. 97, S. 481, S. 1742, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (eliminating federal court jurisdiction
over public school prayer cases); H.R 340, H.R 761, H.R 869, H.R 1079, H.R 1180, H.R 2047,
H.R 3332, H.R 5200, S. 528, S. 1005, S. 1147, S. 1647, S. 1743, S. 1760, 97th Cong., 1st Scss.
(1981) (limiting federal court authority to issue school busing orders in school desegregation
cases); H.R 73, H.R 867, H.R 900, H.R 3225, S. 158, S. 583, 97th Cong., 1st Scss. (1981)
(confining federal court review of abortion laws); S. 917, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) (curtailing
federal jurisdiction of state criminal convictions based on "voluntarily made" confessions); S.
3386, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) (eliminating district court review of state bar admissions); H.R.
10,839, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1935) (dislodging lower federal court power to declare congressional statutes unconstitutional). The above list was culled from Professor Clinton's article which
contains an exhaustive list. See Clinton, supra note 84, at 744-45 & n.4.
282 Congress has narrowed diversity jurisdiction by restricting removal from the state courts.
Removal was originally limited to aliens and nonresident defendants. See Judiciary Act of 1789,
ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 144l(b) (1988)). In 1875, the
right to remove was extended to all plaintiffs and defendants. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137,
§ 2, 18 Stat. 470, 470-71 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1988)). Plaintiffs and
resident defendants in diversity cases lost their removal rights in 1887. See Act of Mar. 3, 1887,
ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 552, 553, amended lrj Act of Aug. 13, 1888, ch. 866, § 2, 25 Stat. 433, 434-35
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federal court. These options, beset with their own difficulties, 283 depend in the first instance upon congressional action, consideration of
which is beyond the scope of this Article. 284
An alternative within judicial control is reducing the number
of cases under federal review or, as Judge Friendly expresses it,
finding a way ·to "avert the flood by lessening the flow. "285 Accordingly, several courts have justified a general domestic relations exception in order to pare down their dockets. 286 For example, in Cherry v.
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1988)). The present day removal statute is essentially the same as the 1887 version. See 28 U.S.C. § 144l(a)-(b) (1988).
283 See, e.g., Chemerinsky & Kramer, supra note 259, at 74 ("[W]hile it may be possible to
increase the size of the federal courts without causing the judicial system tocollapse, adding many
more judges may fundamentally change the nature of that system."). See generaUy Henry J.
Abraham, Limiting Federal Court jurisdidion: A "Self-Inflicted Wound?': 65 juDICATURE 179
(1981); Max Baucus & Kenneth R. Kay, The Court Stripping Bills: Their Impad on the Constitution,
the Courts, and Congress, 27 Vn.r.. L. REv. 988 (1982); Kenneth R. Kay, Limiting Federal Court
Jurisdidion: The Unforeseen Impad on Courts and Congress, 65 juDICATURE 185 (1981); Robert W.
Meserve, Limiting ]urisdidion and Remedies of Federal Courts, 68 A.B.A. J. 159 (1982); Jon 0.
Newman, Restructuring Federal]urisdidion: Proposals to Preserve the Federal judicial System, 56 U.
CHI. L. REv. 761 (1989); Dolores K. Sloviter, Introdudion: Legislative Proposals to Restrid the
jurisdidion of the Federal Courts: Are They Wise? Are They Constitutional?, 27 Vru.. L. REv. 895
(1982); Laurence Tribe, ]urisdidional Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored Rights Out of the Federal
Courts, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 129 (1981).
284 The scope of congressional power to regulate federal court jurisdiction has engendered
a significant debate. See generaUy Carl A. Auerbach, The Unconstitutionality of Congressional
Proposals to Limit the ]urisdidion of Federal Courts, 47 Mo. L. REv. 47 (1982); Paul M. Bator,
Congressional Power over the ]urisdidion of the Federal Courts, 27 Vru.. L. REv. 1030 (1982); Rauol
Berger, Insulation ofjudicial Usurpation: A Comment on Lawrence Sager's "Court-Stripping" Polemic,
44 OHio ST. LJ. 611 (1983); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrid Lower Federal
Court jurisdiction, 83 YALE LJ. 498 (1974); Morris D. Forkosch, The Exceptions and Regulations

Clause ofArticle m and a Person's Constitutional Rights: Can the Latter be Limited lJy Congressional
Power Under the Former?, 72 W.VA. L. REv. 238 (1970); Henry M. Hart Jr., The Power of Congress
to Limit the ]urisdidion ofFederal Courts: An Exercise in Dialedic, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1362 (1953);
Martin H. Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to ControlFederal]urisdidion:
A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 Nw. U. L. REv. 143 (1982); Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods,
Congressional Power to Control theJurisdidion ofLower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New
Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 45 (1975); Charles E. Rice, Limiting Federal Court ]urisdidion: The
Constitutional Basis for the Proposals in Congress Today, 65 juDICATURE 190 (1981); Ronald D.
Rotunda, Congressional Power to Restrid the ]urisdidion of the Lower Federal Courts and the Problem
of School Busing, 64 GEO. LJ. 839 (1976); Sager, supra note 84; Telford Taylor, Limiting Federal
Court ]urisdidion: The Unconstitutionality of Current Legislative Proposals, 65 juDICATURE 199
(1981).

Averting the Flood lJy Lessening the Flow, 59 CoRNEu. L. REv. 634 (1974).
v. Smithson, 883 F.2d 63, 65 (lOth Cir. 1989) (observing that domestic
disputes "crowd the federal court docket"); Kirby v. Mellenger, 830 F.2d 176 (11th Cir. 1987)
(bemoaning "the problem of congested dockets in federal courts"); Rykers v. Alford, 832 F.2d
895, 899-900 (5th Cir. 1987) (lamenting that "such cases serve no particular federal interest,
while crowding the federal court docket"); Ruffalo ex rel. Ruffalo v. Civiletti, 702 F.2d 710, 717
(8th Cir. 1983) (ruing "the problem of congested dockets in federal courts"); see also Congleton
v. Holy Cross Child PlacementAgency, Inc., 919 F.2d 1077, 1079 (5th Cir. 1990); Ingram v. Hayes,
2SS HenryJ. Friendly,
286 See, e.g., Vaughan
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Cherry, 287 the District of Maryland declined jurisdiction over a case

because it was "unwilling to increase the workload of this already
overburdened Court. "288
However sympathetic the plight of overburdened district court
judges, federal court congestion does not justify refusingjurisdiction. 289
To begin with, the number of domestic cases in federal court is now
limited by the requirements of the diversity and federal question statutes. Moreover, those cases not culled from the docket by Anllenbrandt
abstention are really contract, tort, and constitutional cases. Allowing
district court judges to pick and choose cases because they are unattractive to their individual dockets would lend itself to abuse. 290
More importantly, absent a principled exception such as abstention, institutional integrity requires federal courts to hear cases within
their purview. 291 & Professor Shapiro notes, wholesale refusal by federal courts to adjudicate diversity cases simply because they have more

866 F.2d 368, 369-70 (11th Cir. 1988); Goins v. Goins, 777 F.2d 1059, 1063 (5th Cir. 1985);
Peterson v. Babbitt, 708 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir. 1983); Wilkins v. Rogers, 581 F.2d 399, 404 (4th
Cir. 1978); Bossom v. Bossom, 551 F.2d 474, 475-76 (2d Cir. 1976); Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d
371, 372 (9th Cir. 1968); Short ex reL Oosterhous v. Short, 730 F. Supp. 1037, 1039-40 (D. Colo.
1990); Smith v. Pension Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp., 715 F. Supp. 715, 718 (W.D. Pa. 1989);
Daniels v. Stovall, 660 F. Supp. 301, 304 (S.D. Tex. 1987); Beliveau v. Beliveau, 655 F. Supp. 478,
479 (D. Me. 1987); Cook v. Winters, 645 F. Supp. 158, 159-60 (S.D. Tex. 1986); Bates v. Bushen,
407 F. Supp. 163, 164 (D. Me. 1976); LaMontagne v. LaMontagne, 394 F. Supp. 1159, 1160-61
(D. Mass. 1975); Bacon v. Bacon, 365 F. Supp. 1019, 1021 (D. Or. 1973). See generally Ouellette,
supra note 24, at 689 ("Several courts have suggested that the doctrine is justified by the fact that
federal dockets are overcrowded, and allowing domestic relations matters into the federal forum
would only aggravate the problem."); Poker, supra note 24, at 149-50 ("[C]ourts have focused
on the flood oflitigation which would result from the repudiation of the exception.").
287 438 F. Supp. 88 (D. Md. 1977).
288 !d. at 90. Courts have refused jurisdiction on the basis of convenience in other contexts.
See, e.g., Klein v. Walston & Co., 432 F.2d 936, 937 (2d Cir. 1970) (action for fraudulent securities
transaction damages); Aetna State Bank v. Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750, 755 (7th Cir. 1970) (claim
for Securities Exchange Act violation).
289 See generally Atwood, supra note 25, at 599 ("Calendar control is not a valid reason for
dismissal of a case within the court's assigned jurisdiction."); Corrado, supra note 25, at 1364
("The problem of congested dockets . . . is not by itself a justification for cutting back in a
particular area.").
290 Vestal & Foster, supra note 24, at 31 ("It appears that some very serious questions may be
raised about the position adopted by the federal courts where they refused to exercise jurisdiction
simply because of the individuals involved.").
29! Several commentators have therefore criticized the Second Circuit's practice of abstaining
for the purposes of docket control. See Wilber F. Pell,Jr., Abstention-A Primrose Path 1Jy Any Other
Name, 21 DEPAUL L. REv. 926 (1972); Charles Alan Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered,
37 Thx. L. REv. 815 (1959); Comment, Contraction ofFederaljurisdiction: Convenience or Necessity?,
19 U. CHI. L. REv. 361 (1952). But see Note, Power to Decline the Exercise ofFederal jurisdiction, 37
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important things to do directly contravenes the congressional grant of
authority under the diversity statute.29 2
This idea has been specifically endorsed by the Supreme Court.
In Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 293 the Court held that
federal courts may not dismiss cases properly filed in or removed to
federal court ''because the district court considers itself too busy to try"
the matter. 294 Similarly, in Meredith v. Winter Haven, 295 the Court held
that when federal jurisdiction is properly invoked, federal courts have
a duty to decide those issues of state law necessary to render a judgment unless a recognized public policy or defined principle guiding
the exercise of jurisdiction dictates, in an exceptional case, federal
court abstention. 296 It is precisely because picking and choosing among
cases lacks a "defined principle" to guide the exercise of jurisdiction,
that federal court congestion does not justify refusal to hear domestically related cases.
Central to federal courts jurisprudence is the question of the
respective roles of federal and state courts.297 Because these court
systems have concurrent or overlapping jurisdiction,298 the allocation
of power beuveen them is the focus of much federal courts jurisprudence. At the heart of this analysis299 reside the related and often
MINN. L. REv. 169 (1952); Note, Power to Stay Federal Proceedings Pending Termination of Concurrent State Litigation, 59 YALE LJ. 978 (1950).
292 Shapiro, jurisdiction and Discretion, supra note 126, at 587; see also Atwood, supra note 25,
at 599 ("If the federal courts were allowed to choose among cases statutorily assigned to their
jurisdiction on the basis of subjective appeal, Congress' constitutional role in establishing the
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts would be abrogated."); Note, Domestic Relations, supra
note 24, at 638 ("[I]t is questionable whether federal abstention can properly be invoked merely
for administrative convenience to deprive othenvise qualified litigants of an alternative forum to
which they are constitutionally and statutorily entitled.").
293423 u.s. 336 (1976).
294 Id. at 344; see also AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF jURISDICTION
BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL CoURTS 49 (1969) (proposal to codify the abstention doctrine
excluded federal court congestion from the conditions justifYing abstention).
295 320 u.s. 228 (1943).

296Id.
29 7 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies ofFederal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REv. 1141
(1988); Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story: Book Review of Hart and Wechslers The Federal Courts and
the Federal System, 102 HARv. L. REv. 688 (1989) (book review). By comparison, scant attention
is paid to the relationship among federal, tribal, and state courts. But seejudith Resnik, Dependent
Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 671 (1989).
29 8 See generally Cover, supra note 9, at 640 (discussing the possibilities of "vertical" (state-federal) and "horizontal" (state-state) jurisdiction).
299 Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, supra note 126, at 581 ("[F]ederalism and comity
concerns have been critical to the exercise of discretion in the federal courts and should remain
so.").
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indistinguishable notions of federalism 300 and comity. 301 Professor
Shapiro notes that the terms federalism and comity overlap in that
both convey the need for respect between two entities-the state and
federal governments-that are to some degree independent of each
other.302
In practice, federalism and comity influence the way in which we
arrange our dual system so that each conducts business central to its
interests while still being respectful of the interests of the other. Nor
is there an absolute answer as to where those lines should be drawn;

300 See

generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS! CRISIS AND REFORM (1985);
REDISH, supra note 147, at 2-3; Althouse, supra note 144; Amar, supra note 84; Amar, supra note
297, at 1425-26; Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 605 (1988); Chcmerinsky & Kramer, supra note 259; Fallon, supra note 297, at
1143-46; CarlA. McGowan, Federalism-Old and New-and the Federal Courts, 70 GEo. LJ.1421,
1431 (1982); Meltzer, supra note 99, at 433; see also Martha A. Field, The Differing Federalism of
Canada and the United States, 55 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 107 (1992).
301 Professor Wells argues that the Court's comity opinions fail to delineate when comity is
to apply as a general principle. This is because the Court uses a vague description of comity to
shield its seemingly arbitrary decisions. See Michael Wells, The Role of Comity in the Law ofFederal
Courts, 60 N.C. L. REv. 59 (1981); see also Shirley M. Hufstedler, Comity and the Constitution: The
Changing Role of the Federal judiciary, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 841 (1972); Larry Yntema, The Comity
Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REv. 9 (1966); Note, "The New Federal Comity" Pursuit ofYoungcr Ideas In
a Civil Context, 61 IowA L. REv. 784 (1976). Similarly, Mr. Rehnquist contends that comity "is a
toothless abstraction, not a rule, invoked in an infinite variety of contexts to justifY one governmental body's deference to another." SeeRehnquist, supra note 137, at 1066-67.
302 Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, supra note 126, at 583. Two other well known and
accurate explanations arc worth quoting at length. Judge Carl McGowan said that:
Federalism means many things to many people. In its broadest common meaning,
however, it refers to the relations between the states and the general government
under our political system. These relations have involved a dual aspect. First,
federalism has meant the desirability and necessity of the general government
deferring to the states in order to allow them their proper role over issues of state
and local concern. But the other side offederalism is the desirability and necessity
of the state governments' deferring to the general government in issues of national
concern.
McGowan, supra note 300, at 1431. In Younger, the Court defined "comity" as:
a proper respect for state functions, recognition of the fact that the entire country
is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the
belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions
are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
I agree with Professor Shapiro and other commentators that federalism and comity often
overlap and are at times indistinguishable. Consequently, I have linked these concepts. It should
be noted, however, that not all federal courts scholars so freely blur the distinction between
federalism and comity. For example, Dean Aviam Soifer and Professor H.C. Macgill argue
eloquently in their seminal article that the two terms embody different notions of how federal
and state courts have historically related to each other. Thus, according to their understanding,
comity embodies deference, while federalism embraces uniformity of federal rights. See Soifer &
Macgill, supra note 124 at 1188-91.
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in fact, different judicial systems have reached different accommodations of the national and localjudicial systems. For example, Professor
Martha Field notes that in Canada, as opposed to the United States,
the central government controls marriage and divorce while the provincial governments jealously guard their control over labor law.303
Where we choose to draw jurisdictional lines is based on perspective and theory. For example,Judge Richard Posner's theory of federalism uses the economic analysis of "optimal allocations" to determine
federal/state jurisdictional boundaries. 304 In contrast to Judge Posner's
economic approach, Professors Erwin Chemerinsky and Larry Kramer
begin with certain "value choices" that correspond with functions that
the federal government attempts to perform through its litigation
agenda. 305 Similarly, Professor Redish offers a list of normative aspirations for which federal courts should strive. 306 Professor Wells believes
that "the most important issue" in jurisdictional allocation is ''whether
the state's interest in sustaining its regulation or the individual's interest in constitutional constraints on state power should receive the
litigating edge. "307 Professor Fallon characterizes the traditionally opposite approaches to the assertion of power by federal courts over state
courts as an ideological struggle between the advocates of ''Federalist"
and ''Nationalist" theories. 308
The vision of our system offered in this Article requires federal
courts to hear cases within their jurisdiction unless a principled and
303Field, supra note 300, at 108.
304 PosNER, supra note 300, at 172. In his analysis,Judge Posner uses terms "costs," "benefits"
and "externalities" to draw jurisdictional lines. For example, he assumes that judges "act in
accordance with their rational self.interest" and that that interest differs from federal to state.
State court judges are dependant on popular approval and so more sensitive to claims by in-state
residents. Federal judges who have life tenure are more likely to vindicate rights of people who
are locally prejudiced. See id.
305 See Chemerinsky & Kramer, supra note 259, at 77. The six major functions that are
identified are: "Enforcing the United States Constitution;" "Protecting the interests of the federal
government as a sovereign;" "Serving as an umpire in interstate disputes;" "Assuring uniform
interpretation and application of federal law;" "Developing federal common law;" "Hearing
appeals." Id.
306 See Redish, Martian Chronicles, supra note 114. Professor Redish's factors are: "intersystemic cross-pollination, systemic representativeness, litigant choice, litigation efficiency, fundamental fairness, institutionalism, and logical consistency." Id. at 1770 (citations omitted).
307Wells, supra note 124, at 612.
308 See Fallon, supra note 297, at 1143-46. Under the Federalist model, "states emerge as
sovereign entities against which federal courts should exercise only limited powers, and state
courts, which are presumed to be as fair and competent as federal courts, stand as the ultimate
guarantors of constitutional rights." I d. at 1143-44 (citations omitted). By contrast, the Nationalist
model posits that "state sovereignty interests must yield to the vindication of federal rights and
that, because state courts should not be presumed as competent as federal courts to enforce
constitutional liberties, rights to have federal issues adjudicated in a federal forum should be
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well defined exception supports abstention. One such exclusion would
be a well marked area of state expertise and interest, such as secondary
core cases. Another exemption would be cases in any category that
raise difficult questions of unresolved state law. Declining to hear these
cases would be a matter of systemic courtesy, not a reflection on judicial
competence.
B. Domestic Federal Question Cases

Federal courts have restricted their proffered policy reasons for
not hearing domestic relations cases to those arising under diversity
jurisdiction, because of the commonly held view that constitutional
issues were prohibited on jurisdictional rather than jurisprudential
grounds. 309 Nevertheless, I wish to assert that allowing federal courts to
adjudicate domestic federal questions has the added benefit of protecting federal rights. Federal courts will more likely vindicate federal
rights and so dispense a '1uster justice,"310 and: therefore, "parties with
federal questions belong in federal court."311 Implicit in this assertion
is the proposition that federal courts are superior to state courts as
guardians of constitutional rights. This is certainly not an uncontroversial proposition, and in fact lies at the center of a federal courts
debate over parity.312

construed broadly." !d. at 1145 (citation omitted). According to Professor Fallon, Federalist jurists
include Chiefjustices Rehnquist and Burger and justices Harlan, Frankfurter and Powell, while
Nationalistjurists include justices Brennan and Marshall and judge julia Smith Gibbons. See id.
at 1146.
309 But see supra, note 6.
310 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLuM. L. REv. 489,
513 (1954); see also FRIENDLY, FEDERAL jURISDICTION, supra note 260, at 12.
311 Meltzer, supra note 99, at 431; see also England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examin·
ers, 375 U.S. 411, 416 (1964) ("Limiting the litigant to review here would deny him the benefit
of a federal trial court's role in constructing a record and making fact findings. How the facts
are found will often dictate the decision of federal claims.").
In addition to the reasons set forth above, scholars have extrapolated various justifications
for future federal review of certain domestic relations cases. For example, Professor Akhil Amar
has argued with his usual acumen following the Supreme Court decision in Deslzaney that
allegations of child abuse should be construed as thirteenth amendment violations because of
the indicia of slavery involved in the power structure of the parent-child relationship. See Akhil
R Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Tllirteentlz Amendment Response to
Deshaney, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1359, 1372 (1992). Although not intended as the direct consequence
of his assertion, Professor Amaris averring inter alia that some secondary domestic cases call into
play federal questions and therefore merit federal court review. See id.
312 How one sides in this debate is dependant on perspective. I am persuaded by the federal
superiority arguments, but this is because of my experiences litigating in both federal and state
courts. Of course, such an assertion, while empirical, is purely anecdotal.
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Federal courts scholars have asserted the superiority of federal
courts to state courts on both theoretical and practical grounds. Professor Redish, for example, has averred that "the arguments that federal courts are superior are overwhelming."313 Those arguments include the shifted balance of power between federal and state courts
during Reconstruction, the subsequent increase in federal expertise,314
and the lack of structural independence of the state judiciaries.315
Professor Burt Neuborne argues that, beyond theoretical considerations, state and federal courts lack parity. 316 To support this contention,
he offers a number of reasons why federal courts are more sympathetic
to constitutional claimants. These factors include greater technical
competence, the "psychological set" of the court, and insulation from
majoritarian pressures.317
Claims of federal superiority do not go unchallenged. Professor
Paul Bator, for example, is a very outspoken critic of these assumptions.318 Professor Bator argues that allowing state court judges to hear
constitutional claims helps "to assure optimal performance by the state
courts" while, conversely, directing constitutional claims to federal
courts evinces "a narrow and partisan vision of what constitutional
values are. "319 At the same time, Professor Althouse argues the existence of a strong federal interest in allowing states to adjudicate federal
issues, and that this interest should govern the allotment of jurisdiction.320

SIS See Redish, Separation of Powers, supra note 114, at 73.
Si4The thesis is worth quoting at length:
The dramatic changes in the philosophy of federalism, culminating in the Civil War
and enactment of the post-Civil War constitutional amendments and statutes limiting state power to interfere with federal rights, dictated a corresponding shift in
the balance ofjudicial power between state and federal courts.... Since that time
federal courts have developed a vast expertise in dealing with the intricacies of
federal law, while the state judiciary has, quite naturally, devoted the bulk of its
efforts to the evolution and refinement of state law and policy.
REDisH, supra note 147, at 2-3.
315 See Redish, supra note 284, at 161-66; see also Redish, Younger Deference, supra note 114
(federal courts are superior protectors of federal rights); Martin H. Redish, judicial Parity,

Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A Comment on Federal jurisdiction and Constitutional
Rights, 36 UCLA L. REv. 329 (1988) (same); Amar, supra note 84 (arguing that the superiority
of federal judges is advanced by the text of Article III); Amar, supra note 124 (same).
316 See Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1105 (1977).
317 See id. at 1118-28.
318 See Bator, supra note 300.
319 I d. at 623-35; see also Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation in
Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Ana0'sis ofjudicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 213
(1983) (finding that state courts are as likely as federal courts to uphold constitutional rights).
32° See generaUy Althouse, Misguided Search, supra note 144; Althouse, Separate sphere, supra
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Professor Chemerinsky suggests an alternative rationale to federal
superiority for federal court disposition of domestic federal question
cases. 321 Professor Chemerinsky argues that the debate over parity cannot be resolved, because such a determination ultimately depends
upon a nonexistent standard by which to compare empirically the
competing judicial systems.322 Because he finds it "desirable to define
a role for the federal courts without evaluating the comparative abilities of the federal and state courts,"323 he "proposes that litigants with
federal constitutional claims should generally be able to choose the
forum, federal or state, in which to resolve their disputes. "324 Professor
Chemerinsky demonstrates that allowing litigant choice maximizes the
opportunity to protect individual rights, enhances litigants' autonomy,
and enhances federalism. 325 Using this standard also avoids a choice
between competing notions of parity, because allowing the litigants to
choose their own venues negates a value judgment by commentators.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In this Article, I have examined the skewed development of the
domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction from Barber v.
Barber to the contemporary decision of Ankenbrandt v. Richards. Although definitive Supreme Court resolution of the conflicts in this area
must await another day, this Article has shown that following Anlwnbrandt, federal court jurisdiction exists over all non-primary core actions properly arising under either the diversity or federal question
jurisdiction statutes. This Article then addressed the issue of whether
the existence of jurisdiction compelled federal court adjudication of
all domestic related disputes within their purview, or instead permitted
abstention. This Article asserted the propriety of abstention principles
and proposed a new form of abstention whose application would
exclude from federal consideration primary core cases and suits raising
note 144; Ann Althouse, Variations on a Theory ofNormative Federalism: A Supreme Court Diawgue,
42 DUKE LJ. 979 (1993).
321 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal judiciary, 36
UCLA L. REv. 233 (1988).
322 EnYin Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, 71 B.U. L. REv. 593 (1991); see also Chemer·
insky & Kramer, supra note 259, at 79 ('The parity debate is ultimately unresolvable because
parity is an empirical question and we lack a meaningful standard by which to judge decisions
in competingjudicial systems."); Michael Wells, Is Disparity a Problem?, 22 GA. L. REv. 283 (1988)
(asserting that focusing on parity merely obfuscates substantive issues); Wells, supra note 124
(parity unresolvable). But see Solimine & Walker, supra note 319 (submitting an empirical study),
323 Chemerinsky, supra note 321, at 236.
324 /d. at 236--37.
325 /d. at 302-10.
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difficult issues of unresolved state law. It then evaluated the competing
policy concerns informing a federal court's decision whether or not to
exert jurisdiction over non-primary core actions, concluding that prudential considerations support the jurisdictional lines drawn in the
proposed Ankenbrandt abstention doctrine.

